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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on the efforts that the Mexican government has made for the 
regulation of illegal immigration in transit through the country. This study explores the 
origins and trends of Central American migration, the complexity of Mexico’s southern 
border, and the reasons for the failure of plans and programs implemented by three 
different administrations to regulate and protect migration flows. It finds that those plans 
and programs failed because Mexico did not perceive the control of Central American 
illegal immigration as an end; instead, it has been used to foster foreign policy objectives 
or to respond to second-order effects produced by the war against organized crime. 
Since 2000, Mexican administrations have faced different realities, both domestic 
and international, which have shaped their response for border management and the 
regulation of illegal immigration. Security and the reordering of regional migration flows 
have been the priorities, relegating transit migration to a second plane. Mexico has 
accomplished important advances to give certainty and protection to illegal immigrants, 
but an integral and effective framework to regulate migration is lacking. Processes of 
planning, implementation, and evaluation of migration policies are barely defined, and 
the implementation of plans and programs is ineffective due to institutional weaknesses. 
The regulation of transit migration in Mexico is an unresolved issue. 
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This study seeks to answer the following question: Why have the strategies, plans, 
and programs implemented by the Mexican government, since 2000, failed to regulate 
illegal immigration on the southern border of Mexico? To answer this question, this 
thesis identifies Central American illegal immigration trends to the United States through 
Mexico. An assessment of the southern border of Mexico, including the presence of the 
state and illegal migration routes follows. This project then presents an analysis of 
Mexico’s strategies, plans, and programs implemented since 2000 to halt illegal 
immigration.  
Illegal immigration links the northern and southern borders of Mexico; however, 
border management models, policies, and resources vary substantially from one border to 
the other.1 For instance, on the northern border, the United States has invested billions of 
dollars in technology and infrastructure, and the number of border patrol agents has been 
doubled.2 By contrast, the southern border lacks a model for border management,3 and 
the resources available are minimal.4 Factors, such as globalization and free trade, 
socioeconomic inequality between the north and the south, U.S. homeland security 
policies, and the increase of Central American illegal migration have captured the 
Mexican government’s attention.5 Likewise, public and international concerns about 
violence, organized crime, human rights abuses, and unaccompanied alien children have 
                                                 
1 José P. Liedo Fernández, “Diagnóstico General de la Frontera Sur: Región de Limites y Encuentros,” 
ECOfronteras no. 26 (December 2005): 28–33, accessed July 25, 2014. http://revistas.ecosur.mx/
ecofronteras/index.php/eco/article/view/875/868. See also Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S. 
Mexico Divide (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 14. 
2 Rebecca Gambler, “Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security 
Status and Resources Needed,” Government Accountability Office GAO-13-330T (2013): 2, accessed 
August 19, 2014, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652331.pdf. 
3  Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2013–2018. Diario Oficial de la Federación 20–05-2013. Accessed 
October 19, 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/compila/pnd.htm 
4 Raúl Benitez Manaut, “México, Centroamérica y Estados Unidos: Migración y Seguridad,” in 
Migración y Seguridad: Nuevo Desafío de México, ed. Natalia Armijo Canto (Mexico City: Colegio de 
Análisis de la Seguridad Democrática, 2011), 181, ttp://www.seguridadcondemocracia.org/mys/cap10.pdf. 
5 Antonio García García and Edith F. Kauffer Michel, “Transboundary Rivers Basins between Mexico, 
Guatemala, and Belize: From Demarcation to General Issues,” Frontera Norte 23, no. 45 (2011), 
http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?pid=S0187-73722011000100005&script=sci_arttext. 
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dominated media attention in both Mexico and the United States. In view of this, the 
Mexican government has reacted by implementing different types of measures to manage 
its southern border and regulate illegal immigration. For instance, it implemented 
operations such as “Sellamiento” in 1998,6 “Plan Sur” in 2001,7 the “Plan de 
Reordenamiento de la Frontera Sur” in 2008, and the “Programa de Apoyo a la Zona 
Fronteriza” in 2013.8 Furthermore, the government has applied gradual militarization 
policies to secure the border.9 It also used economic development programs and 
migration reforms. Despite these measures, illegal immigration in transit through Mexico 
has not declined; instead, the vulnerability of transit migrants has increased.10 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Movement of people across borders occurred even before the formation of the 
Westphalian state. However, over the past 25 years, international migration has doubled, 
increasing from 154 million people living abroad in 1990, to 232 million people in 
2013.11 Particularly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the interest in border 
control and illegal immigration has increased dramatically. Research has been 
concentrated in developed countries as a destination for migration. Nevertheless, the 
assessment of destination countries must be complemented with an analysis of origin and 
                                                 
6 Carol L. Girón Solorzano, “La Frontera Guatemala–México: Un Intento por Reconocer sus Múltiples 
Dinámicas,” in Fronteras: Rupturas y Convergencias, ed. Fernando Carrión and Victor Llugsha (Quito: 
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, August 2013), 160. 
7 George W. Grayson, “Mexico’s Forgotten Southern Border: Does Mexico Practice at Home What It 
Preaches Abroad?,” Center for Immigration Studies, July 2002, http://cis.org/MexicoSouthernBorder-
Policy. 
8 Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, “Programa de Apoyo a la Zona Fronteriza,” Informe 
Semanal del Vocero, December 2–6, 2013, http://www.shcp.gob.mx/SALAPRENSA/doc_informe_vocero/
2013/vocero_49_ 
2013.pdf. 
9 Raúl Benítez Manaut and Armando Rodríguez Luna, “México: La Seguridad Nacional en 2012,” in 
Seguridad Regional en América Latina y el Caribe; Anuario 2012, ed. Hans Mathieu and Catalina Niño 
Guarnizo (Bogota: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012), 150. 
10 Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Doris Meissner, and Eleanor Sohnen, Thinking Regionally to 
Compete Globally: Leveraging Migration & Human Capital in the US, Mexico, and Central America 
(Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute), May 2013, 16, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/
thinking-regionally-compete-globally-leveraging-migration-human-capital-us-mexico-and. 
11 “232 Million International Migrants Living Abroad Worldwide: New UN Global Migration 
Statistics Reveal,” UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed August 13, 2014. 
http://esa.un.org/unmigration/wallchart2013.htm. 
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transit countries to understand and regulate illegal immigration and to manage borders 
efficiently.12 In this sense, the study of Mexico as a country of immigration, emigration, 
and transit contributes to that purpose.13 
An analysis of Mexico’s immigration policies on the southern border is relevant 
for a number of reasons. First and foremost, identifying well-defined and clear policies 
for border management and illegal immigration regulation can help improve human 
rights conditions, especially those of migrants in transit through Mexico. To some extent, 
clarifying policies can make illegal immigrants less vulnerable to organized crime and 
governmental extortion by law enforcement agencies because they will have access to 
due process, transparent and efficient tools to regularize their status, and to enter and 
transit along the country out of the shadows of illegality. 
An assessment of policies implemented and results obtained thus far can also help 
to identify the gap between Mexico’s official immigration policies, actual border 
management practices, and outcomes. Furthermore, this analysis allows the identification 
of the issue areas in which border resources are more crucial. Until now, much of the 
attention has focused on the role of border patrol agents, yet border management requires 
a panoply of policies, including legal, welfare, and justice resources. 
At present, Mexico is seeking to eliminate discrepancies between its immigration 
and emigration policies to be in a better position to demand better treatment for its 
nationals in the United States.14 This implies a change from the “war on immigration”15 
perspective towards a “friendly but secure gates” approach. Furthermore, the Mexican 
government is attempting to demonstrate that the control of migration can be both 
feasible and flexible “without having to build a wall or limit border mobility.”16 Cecilia 
                                                 
12 Laura V. González-Murphy, Protecting Immigrant Rights in Mexico: Understanding the State-Civil 
Society Nexus (New York: Routledge, 2013), 3. 
13 Papademetriou, Meissner, and Sohnen, Thinking Regionally to Compete Globally, 16. 
14 González-Murphy, Protecting Immigrant Rights in Mexico, 42. 
15 David Androff, “Human Rights and the War on Immigration,” in The Criminalization of 
Immigration: Context and Consequences, ed. Alissa R. Ackerman and Rich Furman (North Carolina: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2014), 148. 
16 González-Murphy, Protecting Immigrant Rights in Mexico, 64. 
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Romero Castillo, former commissioner of the National Immigration Institute, described 
Mexican government policies toward border management with the phrase “friendly but 
secure gates,”17 while emphasizing the equilibrium between human rights and security in 
the regulation of migration. However, she resigned after the Zetas Cartel killed 72 illegal 
immigrants in San Fernando, Tamaulipas,18 proving that if the borders were secure and 
friendly, the migration routes through Mexico were dangerous and hostile. The 
assessment of the Mexican government’s illegal immigration policies and border controls 
applied over time demonstrates how Mexico has modified those policies and controls 
according to national interests and international conditions, and up to what level has been 
successful on switching from securitization to regulation.19 
Reduction of inconsistencies between illegal immigration policies and outcomes 
is complicated because of disagreements at the national and international levels between 
both means and ends.20 This thesis also sheds some light on how bordering states (such 
as the United States and Mexico and/or Central America and Mexico) can jointly manage 
their respective borderlands, synchronizing objectives and methods. As has recently 
become evident with the unaccompanied children migrants from Central America, the 
regulation of immigration flows requires international cooperation and coordination. By 
focusing on the Mexican southern border, this thesis aims to identify the issue areas in 
which Mexico needs to fully cooperate and coordinate with various international actors, 
including bordering states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international 
organizations. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the literature on the southern border of Mexico has focused on its 
historical development, diagnostics about its insecure and porous conditions, and the 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 42. 
18 Randal C. Archibold, “Mexican Official Quits,” The New York Times, September 14, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/15/world/americas/15mexico.html.  
19 González-Murphy, Protecting Immigrant Rights in Mexico, 4. 
20 Philip L. Martin, “The United States: The Continuing Immigration Debate,” in Controlling 
Immigration: A Global Perspective, ed. James F. Hollifield et al., 3rd ed. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 69. 
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characterization of legal and illegal flows across the border. The current threats to this 
border are drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal 
immigration.21 Likewise, the southern border of Mexico is vulnerable for several reasons: 
the weak presence of the state, the lack of doctrine and training of the armed forces used 
in law enforcement functions, the trans-nationality of organized crime and illegal 
immigration, and corruption in the security, political, and administrative branches of 
government.22 Threats and vulnerabilities are a part of the puzzle to explain why the 
state’s plans and strategies have failed to manage the southern border of Mexico and to 
regulate immigration; however, no analysis has explained the gaps between government 
plans, objectives, and results. 
As the main purpose of this study is to investigate why plans and strategies to 
regulate illegal immigration along the southern border of Mexico have failed, it is 
necessary to analyze the literature related to the three main parts of the conundrum: 
illegal immigration, border management, and threats along the southern border of 
Mexico. All three components are introduced in the next section. 
1. Illegal Immigration 
The British were the first to use the term illegal immigration systematically to 
describe undesirable Jewish immigrants to Palestine from 1920 to 1947;23 however, a 
universally accepted definition of illegal immigration does not exist.24 This concept has 
changed according to legal, political, economic, and social factors and the government 
response to what public opinion considers an illegal immigrant.25 The International 
                                                 
21 Comisión Sur Sureste, “Diagnóstico Frontera Sur,” December 6, 2011, http://www.conago.org.mx/ 
reuniones/documentos/2011-12-06/20111201_DIRSS_DIAGNOSTICO_FRONTERA_SUR_TAB.pdf. 
22 Raúl Benítez Manaut, “La Nueva Seguridad Regional: Amenazas Irregulares, Crimen Organizado y 
Narcotráfico en México y América Central,” FRIDE (March 2009): 2.  
23 Frank Düvel, “Irregular Migration,” in Global Migration Governance, ed. Alexander Betts (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 79. 
24 “Key Migration Terms,” International Organization for Migration, accessed July 20, 2014, 
http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/key-migration-terms-1.html. 
25 Kristin Couper and Ulysses Santamaria, “An Elusive Concept: The Changing Definition of Illegal 
Immigration in the Practice of Immigration Control in the United Kingdom,” International Migration 
Review 18, no. 3 (Autumn 1984): 451. 
 6
Organization for Migration argues that sending and receiving countries define illegal 
immigration under their terms, but it makes a distinction between irregular and illegal 
immigration.26 The International Council on Human Rights Policy argues that the term 
“illegal” has been broadly used to support the belief that irregular migrants are criminals 
and to justify restrictive measures to control illegal migration.27 Scholars use a binary 
relation to differentiate between mutually exclusive properties of immigration. They 
identify different immigration pairs like internal vs. international, temporary vs. 
permanent, regular vs. irregular, economic vs. political, and voluntary vs. forced 
migration.28 The classification of immigrations helps to differentiate between causes, 
methods, and purposes of migration, and consequently, contributes to the determination 
of immigration controls and policies and to understand why these policies fail.29 
2. Theories for Developing Illegal Immigration Policies 
Migration policies are laws, regulations, and measures that governments define 
and implement with the objective of controlling the volume, characteristics, and direction 
of immigration.30 However, illegal immigration is an interdisciplinary subject that cannot 
be described using a single theory.31 For instance, neoclassical economic theory argues 
that immigration is based on individual decisions for income maximization and focuses 
on differentials in wages, employment opportunities, and the costs and risks of migration 
to describe migration flows.32 This theory explains that labor markets are the primary 
mechanism shaping migration flows, and the differential of expected returns between 
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countries regulates the dimension of those flows. Neoclassical economics advocates 
conclude that the most effective way for governments to regulate migration is to 
influence labor markets accordingly to their interests.33 Policies using a market’s 
perspective to control illegal immigration ignore issues like forced migration and social 
networks; therefore, the results of these policies will be a reduction of economic 
migration without resolving other types of migration. 
The new economics of migration theory challenges the assumptions and 
conclusions of neoclassical theory. It combines family decision making with neoclassical 
economics to explain the causes of migration. This approach argues that migration 
decisions are not based on individual interests; instead, they are the result of family and 
household consensus.34 The choice to migrate is the result of combining income 
maximization, income diversification, and risk aversion at the household level. Therefore, 
a decline in the economic gap between sending and receiving countries does not 
necessarily imply a reduction of international migration.35 Advocates of the new 
economics of migration argue that governments can regulate immigration flows by 
enacting policies to influence labor, insurance, and capital markets;36 however, these 
policies ignore pushing factors like organized crime related violence and ethnic cleansing 
producing forced migration. 
Other scholars have proposed a systems approach for studying migration because 
of its analytical focus on structure, relations, and process. The use of systems theory 
allows the study of immigration and the development of policies beyond a linear, causal, 
and push-pull explanation to an emphasis on circular, multi-causal, and interdependent 
movements.37 This theory concludes that political and economic changes produce an 
evolution of the immigration system that finally reaches stability; however, that stability 
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does not imply a permanent structure.38 Critics of the systems approach argue that is not 
possible to construct a reliable model of the immigration system and policies for its 
regulation because of the lack of data available and the ingenuity and spontaneity of 
migrants that change the system in response to those policies.39 
An extension of system theory for understanding immigration is the study of 
migration networks theory. Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that connect 
migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination countries. The 
main types of networks are family and personal, labor, and illegal immigrant. These 
networks increase the propensity of international migration because they lower 
transactional costs and risks of movement and increase the expected net returns. This 
theory concludes that once international migration has begun, it expands over time up to 
a maximum in which movement occurs without difficulty; then migration decreases. For 
networks theory, migration is not a consequence of wage differentials or employment 
rates and becomes increasingly independent of the initial structural or individual factors 
that motivate it; instead, migration is a function of the expansion of personal relations and 
the growth of migrant nets. According to Russell King, networks theory allows the 
formulation of policies considering individual and socio-structural factors that go beyond 
causal explanations and push-pull theories. He argues that network theory helps to 
understand the dynamics of migration; resolve the distinction between the initial causes 
of migration, its perpetuation, and its diffusion in time and space;40 however, the 
strictness of this theory to social aspects make it inadequate to develop illegal 
immigration policies to control all phases of migration. 
Scholars have used political science (Marxist, partisan politics, and institutional 
approaches), international relations, sociology, and psychology to explain illegal 
immigration policies.41 The Marxist approach describes the way in which states 
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implement selective immigration policies in pursuing economic gains through low-wage 
workers. The domestic politics approach depicts how public opinion, xenophobia, 
economic, and social factors shape immigration policies. The institutional approach 
describes the policy-making processes of immigration policy, and it is more related to the 
regulation of refugees and migrant workers. International relations approaches are useful 
for identifying the participation of international organizations and the establishment of 
international regimes to regulate immigration in aspects, such as labor, human rights, 
refugees, and human trafficking. Sociology and psychology approaches describe the 
historical experiences, cultural relations, and social conflicts that have shaped 
immigration policies.42 All these theories contribute to defining immigration policies and 
controls, but each suffers from certain limitations. 
For instance, Eytan Meyers argue that political sciences and comparative politics 
contribute more than international relations approaches to the understanding of 
immigration policies. He explains that since international relations approaches describe 
the relations between states rather than domestic policies, they cannot identify the effects 
of immigration on the sovereignty, society, politics, identity, and states’ national 
interests. Nonetheless, Meyers explains that the tendency to identify illegal immigration 
as a national security threat has increased the relevance of international relations 
theories.43 Meyers’s arguments are realistic because he affirms that destination countries 
for immigration are stronger than the ones of origin, and they can impose illegal 
immigration regimes to deter and punish immigrants. However, he ignores the effects of 
globalization and interdependence, the emergence of transit states, and the argument of 
many scholars that a single country cannot eradicate transnational problems as illegal 
immigration. 
Migration theories previously explained are not contradictory, but they have 
different implications for policy makers. Depending on the theory selected, policies to 
regulate migration are oriented to reduce the differential of economic and labor 
conditions between origin and destination countries, to create new markets, to establish 
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social insurance programs in sending societies, to increase deterrence measures and 
border controls,44 or to combine some of these actions.45 Scholars agree that regular and 
illegal migration will persist while transnational relations, economic inequality between 
origin and destination countries, and poor living conditions and violence in origin 
countries continue to exist.46 Immigration policies have failed because they have no 
direct relation with structural factors, such as labor market imbalances, economic 
inequality, and political conflicts in origin countries.47 Therefore, the context of each 
country must define the theory or the combination of theories used to develop illegal 
immigration policies and their adaptation. 
Illegal immigration has become a national security concern, with three competing 
and complementary areas to define immigration controls: human rights, security, and the 
economy.48 However, governments have prioritized security and the economy with the 
subsequent marginalization of human rights.49 Some states relate illegal immigration to 
the inflows of illegal drugs, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Governments’ 
efforts to diminish these illicit flows have been concentrated at international borders 
because such global activities are driven by transnational criminals seeking to exploit the 
geographic and jurisdictional complexity of borders and borderlands.50 The next section 
describes border management theories for their relevance to the regulation of illegal 
immigration. 
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3. Border Management 
Borders are defined and treated according to the context and necessities of the 
entities separated or connected through them. States require the knowledge of that 
context and the socioeconomic and political complexities of borders to manage them 
efficiently. Geoffrey Hale explains that borders are both political and societal constructs 
that reflect the ways in which states define their policies for border management. He also 
describes how those policies changed over time from globalization and regionalization 
during the 1990s that contributed to the incremental cross-border flows of people and 
goods, to the growing emphasis on security during the last decade.51 Likewise, Otwin 
Marenin explains that while borders provide security against changing transnational 
threats and protection for social and economic interests, they can simultaneously be open 
for trade and guest workers. One of his most valuable contributions is the distinction 
between process and space, when mentioning, “Borders exist wherever controls over the 
mobility of people, goods, services and capital in and out of states or regions are 
exercised.”52 Therefore, states can manage borders and regulate illegal immigration using 
extraterritorial measures. 
Border management is a combination of state policies and actions oriented to 
regulate immigration, facilitate trade, provide security, and fight illicit activities; 
however, disagreement occurs at the national and international levels about models, 
means, and ends to manage borders.53 The border management major dilemma is to 
determine measures to allow free trade and the movement of legal migrants and refugees 
through the border while blocking illegal migrants, criminals, and other illicit flows.54 
Some scholars suggest a balanced border management approach between open and closed 
borders. They argue that globalization and security threats demand innovative ways to 
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manage borders in which it is possible to facilitate a global free market and 
simultaneously protect a state’s sovereignty, national identity, and citizens’ interests. 
Academics also recognize that border management processes filtering legal from illicit 
flows must balance human rights, security, and economic concerns.55 However, since 
2001, illegal immigration has become a national security issue,56 and the trend in 
developed countries has been to prioritize security and law enforcement perspectives to 
control borders, which is contradictory to globalization, economic interdependence, and 
social and humanitarian protection.57  
Governments have used globalization as an excuse to tighten immigration 
controls, which have transformed an economic and law enforcement issue into a national 
security concern. Valsamis Mitsilegas explains that globalization has transformed 
immigration policies following three major trends: securitization; delegation of 
immigration control to the private sector, government agencies, or databases; and 
extraterritoriality.58 Some states relate illegal immigration with organized crime, 
terrorism, and economic and social instability, a vision that has allowed the imposition of 
a global regime for the securitization of borders and the criminalization of immigration. 
According to Mitsilegas, controlling illegal immigration through securitization has 
increased the power of the state at the expense of human rights of immigrants and 
citizens. He argues that the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized 
Crime and its additional protocols for preventing human trafficking and smuggling were 
the first international instruments to control illegal immigration, but instead of seeking 
the protection of immigrants, they were prompted by security concerns and as a excuse 
for the globalization of stricter border controls.59 The orientation on security has 
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increased the complexity for coexistence and interdependence in borderlands; however, 
that approach has been adopted on different scales according to the context, resources, 
and the capacity of states to resist internal and external pressures. 
Securitization includes interdiction, deterrence, and networked intelligence 
capabilities to control illegal immigration,60 and it allows the implementation of 
extraterritorial measures to regulate people’s mobility beyond borders.61 However, 
stricter border controls have not reduced illegal immigration flows. On the contrary, some 
scholars argue that securitization has produced a proliferation and sophistication of 
human smuggling and trafficking networks.62 Furthermore, securitization has forced 
illegal migrants to become more adventurous and ingenious in crossing borders, 
subjecting them to a greater risk of being wounded, kidnapped, or assassinated.63 
One approximation related to securitization is the militarization of borders, a 
practice that according to Ivan Briscoe has been common in Latin American governments 
in an effort to interrupt criminal networks and to cleanse corrupt public security agencies. 
He explains how that tendency has produced more vulnerability in the long term given 
that institutions are not created and consolidated to assume management of borders once 
the armed forces turn to other functions.64 Michael Shifter argues that a militarized 
approach, even its popularity, and at some degree, its necessity in Central America and 
Mexico, has not produced sustainable results, and just serves as a partial solution to 
increase the seizure of drug shipments and capture organized crime leaders, but without 
addressing the deficiencies in law enforcement institutions and the socioeconomic roots 
of criminal violence.65 Likewise, Arturo Sotomayor explains that international pressures 
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and tacit support of civil society have produced Mexico’s militarization. He identifies 
unintended consequences of militarization, including human rights violations, erosion of 
civilian oversight, lack of coordination among security agencies, and spillover effects in 
Central America.66 Sotomayor suggests that high levels of violence related to the 
presence of Mexican organized crime groups in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras 
can produce forced migration as during the civil wars in these countries during the 1980s 
and 1990s. 
International institutions, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe and the World Customs Organizations, have developed border management 
models to improve effectiveness and efficiency of border procedures and coordination 
among agencies. Those models are Collaborative Border Management, Coordinated 
Border Management, Comprehensive Border Management, and Integrated Border 
Management (IBM).67 The difference between these models is the type of agencies 
involved, the level of organization, and the extension of border control. Collaborative 
Border Management includes the participation of domestic agencies related to border 
management in an intensive but informal manner. In the Coordinated Border 
Management model, national border agencies coordinate efforts through formalized 
channels. Under the Comprehensive Border Management approach, all government 
agencies participate in the control of the border through direct and indirect programs. 
IBM differs from the other border management models since it has an extraterritorial 
scope. The objective of IBM is to achieve national and international coordination and 
cooperation among authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade 
facilitation to achieve open but well controlled and secure borders.68 
The conceptual framework of the IBM model consists of control and surveillance, 
operational and interagency cooperation, risk analysis and threat assessment, a four-tier 
filter access control model, the exchange of information, use of technology, and 
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coordination at the national and transnational levels.69 Otwin Marenin argues that border 
management strategies are based on the use of technology and dispersed systems oriented 
to individuals and not to the border.70 He explains how technology can be used to 
“delocalize” the border to reduce the pressure exerted over it, and to enhance the control 
of flows and security.71 Marenin introduces the concept of “collateral thickening” as an 
indirect way to control borders,72 and he explains the risks, advantages, and requirements 
to implement horizontal and vertical integration approaches for border management.73  
Since illegal immigration is a transnational phenomenon, the European Union is 
using and promoting IBM to manage external borders through extraterritorial controls.74 
These controls have allowed the thickening of the border with the implementations of 
pre-admission measures outside the destination countries, the deterring of immigration at 
the source countries, and the circumvention of domestic laws since they do not apply 
outside their territory.75 The European Union through the Border Security in Central 
America (SEFRO) program is helping to implement the IBM model in this region.76 With 
the implementation of Pastor’s idea of North American integration,77 the IBM model can 
be applied through different layers of control inside, along the border, and outside the 
region with the cooperation of neighbor states. However, the divergence of interests, 
unilateralism, and socioeconomic and cultural differences make the adoption of the IBM 
model in North America more complicated than in Europe. Likewise, Daniel Villafuerte 
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Solis describes some instruments for security integration in Central and North America as 
the Third Border Initiative, the Smart Border Agreement,78 and the High-Level Group on 
Border Security (GANSEF), but he does not include an assessment about the application 
of such instruments and how they have contributed to regional integration.79 
4. The Complexity of Mexican Borders 
Mexico is a country of contrasts, with cultural, economic, and social distinctions 
between the northern and southern parts of the country. Robert D. Kaplan explains that 
Mexico does not have geographical unity, with northern Mexico being closer to the 
United States than to the rest of the country.80 Peter Andreas describes the U.S.–Mexico 
border as the busiest one in the world and as a point of contact between paradoxical 
conditions as the poor and the rich, and as law enforcement and law evasion.81 He 
emphasizes the construction of a borderless economy, and simultaneously, a barricade 
border, and describes the game between law enforcement agencies, policy makers, and 
organized crime consisting of a reinforced cycle of measures and countermeasures. 
Andreas identifies the unintended consequences of different measures implemented to 
reduce drug trafficking and illegal immigration, the new functions of borders, and the 
policy approaches implemented to control them using as case studies the U.S.–Mexico 
border and a comparative of the Germany–Poland and Spain–Morocco borders. He 
mentions the actors and roles in the legal and illegal flows from Colombia to Canada, but 
misses the participation of Central America and the southern border of Mexico in 
defining and controlling those flows. 
The economic and social relations between Mexico and the United States, U.S. 
security policies since 9/11, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking have made the 
                                                 
78 Marenin, “Democratic Oversight and Border Management,” 5. 
79 Daniel Villafuerte Solís, “The Southern Border of Mexico in the Age of Globalization,” in 
Borderlands; Comparing Border Security in North America and Europe, ed. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly 
(Ottawa, Canada: University of Ottawa Press, 2007), 323, 6. 
80 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Border is Vanishing as Mexico Pushes North,” Newsweek, September 11, 
2012, http://www.newsweek.com/border-vanishing-mexico-pushes-north-64645. 
81 Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S. Mexico Divide (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2009), xiv. 
 17
U.S.–Mexico border a widely studied area. In contrast, knowledge about the southern 
border of Mexico is quite limited.82 The contradiction is that both borders are 
interconnected, and unsecure conditions and illegal flows crossing the south have 
repercussions in the north. Paul Ganster and David E. Lorey make a historical analysis of 
the U.S.–Mexico border, and identify the social, economic, political, and security factors 
that have shaped that border over time and the challenges for the 21st century.83 Imtiaz 
Hussain uses the description of the U.S.–Mexico border presented by Ganster and Lorey, 
international relations theory, and the Michael C. LeMay’s analytical clusters to compare 
northern and southern Mexican borders and to describe their evolution. He explains that 
results to regulate immigration in the United States and Mexico have been limited 
because both countries use unilateral and state-centric policies to manage their respective 
southern borders, despite the transformation of Mexico from being just an emigration 
country to a platform for Central American migration to the United States. Hussain 
concludes that unilateral and state-centric migration policies “have simply not worked,” 
and he proposes a “supranational migration cure”84 to regulate migration based on an 
assessment of immigration policy clusters, the development of multilateral agreements, 
and governance.85 The United States and other destination countries of immigration are 
reluctant to grant binding powers to international institutions or to create a global regime 
to regulate immigration. Therefore, Hussain’s neoliberal approach to controlling illegal 
immigration is honest but challenging. 
The two priorities for the security and management of the Mexican borders are 
migration and organized crime;86 however, no consensus exists about the best strategy to 
face these challenges.87 Jorge L. Hidalgo Castellanos argues that all three levels of 
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government, the private and academic sectors, civil society, NGOs, and neighboring 
countries must participate in the diagnostic and implementation of programs for the 
comprehensive development of the border areas.88 He mentions that mechanisms already 
exist for the management of the border, but they are not integrated.89 Hidalgo Castellanos 
identifies the lack of a comprehensive risk assessment of the southern border of Mexico 
and the uncoordinated application of related strategies and policies. Likewise, Luis 
Herrera-Lasso explains that the policy of Mexico for the control of borders and the 
related laws are indeed restrictive but not applied. To follow the law is more a personal 
decision because in relation to a few formal border crossings, much more informal ones 
exist for vehicles and pedestrians. Existing laws with no authority to enforce them has 
generated an environment ideal for corruption and human rights violations that fill the 
pockets of authorities and gangs equally.90 Castellanos and Herrera-Lasso’s arguments 
offer an overview of state’s failure to regulate illegal immigration; however, they do not 
explain the relation between government’s strategies and programs with deficiencies in 
border management. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis begins with the following conundrum. The Mexican government has 
designed and implemented strategies, plans, and programs to manage its southern border 
and to regulate illegal immigration, but a gap exists between the government’s efforts and 
results. The establishments of plans and programs to secure the border, including its 
militarization, has not prevented drug trafficking and illegal immigration through the 
border. It is estimated that 90% of drugs entering the United States pass through 
Mexico.91 Furthermore, the Central American immigrant population in the United States 
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has continued growing. In 2011, 14% of the 11.5 million illegal immigrants residing in 
the United States were from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.92 Likewise, the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection reported an increment of 629% of unaccompanied alien 
children apprehensions from 2009 to 2013.93 In contrast, the number of immigrants from 
Central America retained and deported from Mexico declined gradually during the period 
2005–2010, with a cumulative reduction of 72%, as the events decreased from 223,000 to 
64,000,94 and then raised again since 2011. Moreover, the southern border of Mexico has 
more than 350 illegal points of entry (POE) in comparison with 10 legal POE.95 
The construction of hypotheses to answer the research question requires the 
recognition that a complete control of borders and the total suppression of illegal 
immigration are possible only under exceptional circumstances and through anti-
democratic means. Therefore, hypotheses proposed are not seeking to explain why 
Mexico has not been able to achieve a complete operational control of its southern border 
or to determine which policy is more convenient to regulate illegal immigration; instead, 
they are oriented to explaining the gaps between government policies and outcomes, how 
those policies have changed, the factors that produced that change, and which results 
were obtained. 
The first step to regulating illegal immigration along the borders is the 
identification of threats and challenges, and from that diagnostic, define objectives and 
originate related policies. The second step is executing those policies, assigning 
resources, designating responsibilities, and implementing coordination channels. Finally, 
governments implement processes of coordination, oversight, and accountability as 
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feedback for further improvements. Hypotheses to explain the gap between policies and 
results regulating illegal immigration on the southern border of Mexico are related to 
these stages, and they can be categorized in two groups, deficiencies in the policy-making 
process and inefficiencies in their implementation. 
Deficiencies related to the policy-making process are related to the following 
causes: absence of policies, poorly defined or nonexistent objectives, a lack of a legal 
framework, policies developed without an integrated approach, and those driven by 
internal and external pressures. From the combination of these deficiencies, two scenarios 
emerge. First, the “turn a blind eye state” that comprises a situation in which the state 
pretends not to see illegal immigration problems or unsecured borders. Second, the 
“laundry state” that encompasses a country dedicated to doing the dirty work of others 
with policies oriented to deter people’s mobility and criminalize migrants instead of 
attending to national needs and obligations. Moreover, I argue that well-designed plans 
and programs can be inefficiently implemented because of corruption, lack of 
coordination among government levels and agencies, incoherence between objectives and 
resources, insufficient evaluation tools, absence of infrastructure and technology, and 
discontinuity of authorities.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis consists of three principal components: Central American illegal 
immigration, the southern border of Mexico, and plans and programs to regulate 
migration. Illegal immigration is a transnational phenomenon that exploits borders and is 
defined in part by border controls and policies. An independent assessment of each 
component is useless because they are interrelated and self-reinforcing. Therefore, a 
systemic approach is required to identify the encompassing whole, the evaluation of the 
complex interrelations and processes among its constituent parts, and the explanation of 
the behavior and properties of the complete system. 
A case study is used because this thesis is focused on explaining why the Mexican 
government’s strategies, plans, and programs have failed to regulate illegal immigration 
on the southern border of Mexico. It allows an in-depth investigation of the problem and 
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the identification of social, economic, security, and political factors related to the 
phenomenon of interest. The case study is conducted primarily through a documentary 
research and second data analysis. Documents included are academic books and journals, 
government reports, newspaper articles, NGOs’ reports, and books on Central American 
immigration, the southern border of Mexico, and border management models and 
efficiency measures. The second data sources used are statistics from the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, the Mexican National Migration Institute, General Directorates of 
Migration in Central America, NGOs, and international organizations, such as the United 
Nations, the World Bank, and the International Organization for Migration. This 
information includes statistics about immigration in all its phases, organized related 
violence, human rights violations, and border management resources. 
The case study covers the period from 2000 to present; therefore, a longitudinal 
analysis is used considering the current and two previous Mexican government 
administrations. It includes the Vicente Fox administration from 2000–2006, the Felipe 
Calderón administration from 2006–2012, and the current administration of Enrique 
Peña-Nieto.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis starts with most dynamic and least controllable component: the 
description of prevalent illegal immigration trends from the Central American Northern 
Triangle to the United States through Mexico. This first chapter includes the 
characterization of migration through the identification of its causes, statistics of 
immigration in all its facets, and particularities of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador 
as countries of emigration. An assessment of the social, political, security, and economic 
conditions of the southern border of Mexico follows. The second chapter includes a 
description of the historical evolution of the border, the principal characteristics and 
components of the border, infrastructure and resources for immigration control, the routes 
followed by immigrants, actors involved in shaping immigration trends, and the 
hardships immigrants suffer on their journey through Mexico. 
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Chapter IV presents an analysis of Mexico’s strategies, plans, and programs 
executed since 2000 to regulate illegal immigration. The Fox, Calderón, and Peña Nieto 
administrations are included in the assessment considering the context, internal and 
external factors that shaped immigration and border control policies, national 
development plans, resources assigned, border management plans and programs, 
immigration control objectives, effectiveness parameters, and international agreements. 
The assessment of those mechanisms will help to identify three gaps. The first is a 
discursive gap consisting of the difference between political discourse and plans and 
programs implemented. The second is the operational gap that differentiates between 
plans and programs and their implementation. Finally, the efficiency gap describes the 
impact that those plans and programs have to regulate illegal immigration. Finally, 
conclusions are presented related to the complexity of systems and methods used to 
manage the southern border of Mexico, the factors that motivate illegal immigration, the 
points of intervention defined by three different Mexican governments to regulate 
migration, and the results and second–order consequences of the policies implemented. 
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II. CENTRAL AMERICAN ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN 
TRANSIT THROUGH MEXICO 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the condition of Mexico as a transit 
country for migration, and the causes and trends of illegal immigration from Central 
America to the United States. These issues are relevant to understand the gap between 
plans and policies to regulate illegal immigration on the southern border of Mexico and 
its outcomes because they must guide the development of migration policies, the 
definition of points of intervention, and the assessment of their results. This chapter starts 
with the description of Mexico as a transit country and the historical development of 
Central American migration. Subsequently, the causes and trends of illegal immigration 
from Central America are explained, with emphasis on economic, security, social, and 
political factors. Then, specifications about migration from the countries of the Central 
American Northern Triangle are described. And finally, conclusions are presented. 
Mexico is a country of immigration, emigration, and transit. This multifaceted 
character is a product of its geopolitical condition as neighbor and commercial partner of 
the United States. Mexico stands between the developing and the developed worlds, 
connecting and simultaneously distancing the United States from Latin America. Illegal 
immigrants from Central and South America, and even from East Europe and Asia, 
attempt to reach the United States through Mexico,96 using the same routes and services 
as Mexican migrants. Furthermore, some migrants from Central America stay in Mexico, 
strengthening the commercial, cultural, and social ties between these regions, inspiring 
many to describe the control of the southern border of Mexico as an unnecessary 
formality.97  
Central American illegal immigration is a product of different internal and 
external factors, and it has evolved according to conditions in origin, transit, and 
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destination countries. Internal pulling factors are the availability of employment, 
economic development, and social ties; likewise, internal pushing factors include high 
levels of violence, inequality, poverty, and natural disasters. External factors are related 
to the economic gap between origin and destination countries, immigration legislation, 
border controls, risks and threats for migration flows, and social networks.98 Any policy 
to regulate illegal immigration has to be oriented to solve these internal and external 
factors motivating migration.  
A. MEXICO AS A TRANSIT COUNTRY 
Although Mexico is mainly identified as an emigration country, over the past 
decade it has experienced a dramatic escalation in transit migration and a considerable 
growth in legal and illegal immigration. Ann Kimbal introduces the concept of the transit 
state to explain how policies and plans are implemented to regulate transit migration.99 
She explains that Mexico is a transit state because it borders a fully developed country, 
exhibits high emigration and moderate immigration, serves as a platform for migrants to 
enter the U.S., implements restrictive immigration policies, and acts as a gatekeeper for 
the United States.100 
Given its nature, the accurate tracking of the number of illegal immigrants 
crossing through Mexico is challenging. Estimations range from 150,000 according to 
official reports, up to 500,000 according to NGOs.101 Three statistics demonstrate the 
multifaceted character of Mexico as an immigration and transit country. The first is the 
number of legal foreign residents and workers. Despite the low figure of immigrants 
residing in Mexico compared to the 42.8 million residing in the U.S., in the last decade 
they more than doubled to an actual level of 961,000 people, representing 0.9 percent of 
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the total population of the country in 2010.102 Furthermore, Central American border 
residents have an old tradition of entering Mexico for commercial, economic, and social 
purposes. Mexico is increasingly relying on Guatemalan workers for its seasonal 
agriculture, with permits for approximately 40,000 Guatemalan temporary workers per 
year.103 In addition to agribusinesses, Central Americans work in the construction 
industry, in services such as domestic household workers, in informal activities including 
children selling candy on the streets, workers in the municipal trash dump, and in 
prostitution. Guatemalans and Belizeans are also able to enter Mexico as border residents, 
which allow them to stay within 100 kilometers north of the border in the states of 
Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, and Campeche without a tourist visa.104 This formal 
and informal flows spoiled by the Mexican government characterize the migration policy 
that has persisted over different administration, consisting on opening the borders for 
regional movement and closing it for transit migrants. 
The second form to measure transit migration flows is the number of 
apprehensions and deportations of illegal immigrants in Mexican territory. 
Apprehensions increased between 1999 and 2005 to a maximum of 240,269, but then 
started to decline in 2007 and leveled off between 2009 and 2011 with 66,583 
apprehensions and 61,034 deportations.105 In 2012, the number of apprehensions reached 
70,866;106 in 2013 this number increased again to 86,298, and data from the first four 
months of 2014 indicates an approximate 9 percent jump in deportations,107 indicating an 
upward trend in the last years (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1.  Apprehension of Illegal Immigrants in Mexico from 1999 to 2013. 
The distribution of apprehensions by country of origin illustrates the 
overwhelming majority of illegal immigrants coming from the Central American 
Northern Triangle. For example, from the apprehensions in 2012, 45.3 percent were from 
Guatemala, 32.6 percent from Honduras, 14 percent from El Salvador, and 8.1 percent 
among all other countries.108 The data from 2013 indicates a change of distribution, with 
40.4 percent of illegal immigrants apprehended from Honduras, 35.5 percent from 
Guatemala, and 16.9 from El Salvador (Figure 2). More recently, during the first three 
months of 2014, Mexico carried out 18,696 deportations of which 2,851 were of 
individuals below 18 years of age.109 The increase of apprehensions in Mexico does not 
necessarily mean that Central American illegal immigrants are not succeeding in crossing 
the country and reaching the U.S. Depending on the country of origin, Central Americans 
use different routes to enter and transit through Mexico, and they have dissimilar levels 
of social networks and migration experience that could help to explain the variation of the 
nationality of apprehended. Furthermore, regional migration policies as temporary-
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worker programs implemented in Mexico benefit Guatemalans and Belizeans, releasing 
some pressure from their need to migrate north; however, Hondurans are excluded from 
those programs. 
 
Figure 2.  Comparative of Illegal Immigrants Apprehended in Mexico from the 
Central American Northern Triangle. 
The third way of measuring transit migration is through the number of 
apprehensions of those other than Mexicans on the U.S.–Mexico border. Approximately 
40 percent of all Central American migrants in the U.S. are from El Salvador, followed 
by 27 percent from Guatemala, and 16.1 percent from Honduras (Figure 3). These 
countries have emigration rates between 9 and 16 percent. Moreover, it is estimated that 
more than 40 percent of the Central American population in the United States lack legal 
status and another 10 percent reside under Temporary Protection Status (TPS).110  
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Figure 3.  Migrants from Central America Residing in the United States. 
Between 2000 and 2010, Central American immigrants were the fastest-growing 
group in the United States, jumping from 2 to 3.1 million with a growth rate of 51 
percent, even ahead of Mexican migrants (28 percent). The number of “other than 
Mexican” (OTM) migrant apprehensions has nearly tripled in two years—54,098 in 
2011—and this number reached 153,055 in 2013. For the first time, more than a third of 
migrants whom the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended were not Mexican, and the 
overwhelming majority was from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This upward 
trend has been more evident during 2014 in which the Border Patrol has already 
apprehended 202,951 OTM migrants, exceeding the full-year total for 2013.111 
Furthermore, in fiscal year 2014, an estimated 77,200 children are expected to be 
apprehended at the U.S.–Mexico border, including 59,000 children from Central 
America.112 Comparing the number of apprehensions of OTM in the United States-
Mexico border and of Central Americans on the southern border of Mexico, there is a 
difference of 66,757 illegal immigrants that transited Mexico, giving indication of the 
failure of the government to regulate migration flows.  
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B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL AMERICAN 
MIGRATION 
During the 1960s, Mexico’s migration policy was based on the protection of the 
labor market for the domestic workforce, allowing the entrance of migrants who could 
prove economic solvency.113 The growth of coffee plantations and other economic 
activities in the 1960s and 1970s demanded a large workforce, especially at harvest 
season, generating an extended labor market that was fulfilled by Central American 
temporary workers and illegal immigrants.114 Until the 1970s, internal or regional 
movements of a temporal character and economic purpose defined Central American 
migration; however, civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and political violence from 1974 to 
1996 changed those patterns, producing internal displacements and forced migration.115  
The first Central Americans to arrive in Mexico were the Nicaraguans, who 
headed to the U.S. in the 1970s, escaping the Somoza dictatorship and the Sandinista 
War. The next and more challenging group of Central Americans seeking refuge in 
Mexico began to arrive in 1981, composed of large numbers of Guatemalan peasants 
escaping from state-led massacres. The arrival of Spanish Republicans, Irish, Argentines, 
Turkish Jews, Eastern Europeans, Lebanese, and Cubans seeking refuge during the 
twentieth century had provided Mexico with the experience to deal with this type of 
humanitarian crises; however, the number and socio-economic conditions of Guatemalan 
refugees had no precedent.116 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), about 200,000 Guatemalans arrived in Mexico during the 1980s, but 
only 46,000 were officially registered and assisted by UNHCR.117 After peace was 
restored in the 1990s, many of them returned to their country, although around 20,000 
remained in Mexico as legal residents.118 The next migrants were Salvadorans, who 
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escaped their country from the civil war between state forces and the Frente Farabundo 
Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). The presence of Central American refugees 
in Mexico had some unintended consequences, including the militarization of the border, 
the participation of civil society to protect and provide services to immigrants, the surge 
of professional smugglers, and the establishment of social networks and routes of future 
illegal migration.119 
After the signing of the peace accords, the economic and social relations across 
borders between Mexico and Central America were resumed and intensified. Mexico 
instituted a series of programs to facilitate the movement and economic participation of 
border communities, such as border resident permits (Forma Migratoria de Visitante 
Local, FMVL), visas for agricultural workers (Forma Migratoria de Visitante Agrícola, 
FMVA), and general laborer visas (Forma Migratoria de Trabajador Fronterizo, 
FMTF).120 However, most Central American countries faced poor economic conditions 
and recurrent social and political instability. In consequence, Central American migration 
evolved in character and dimension, from regional displacement to massive transnational 
flows, using the networks and knowledge obtained during the refugee era in Mexico to 
reach the U.S.121 
In addition to economic stagnation and the crisis in international coffee prices,122 
other factors complicated the conditions for livelihood in Central America. For instance, 
recurrent natural disasters—hurricanes, tropical storms, and earthquakes—uprooted 
thousands of people in the region.123 Furthermore, high homicide rates increased the 
number of illegal immigrants seeking entry into Mexico and the United States.124 
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C. CAUSES OF CENTRAL AMERICAN ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION  
Central American illegal immigration originates mainly from the Northern 
Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.125 Even though these 
countries have some structural differences, the regional cooperation represented by free 
trade agreements, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and the 
Central America-4 (CA-4) Agreement allows the identification of common regional 
causes for illegal immigration. Citizens from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua enjoy free movement among these four countries without a passport; 
furthermore, the borders between these countries are basically uncontrolled, allowing the 
illegal crossings of goods and people at will.126 
Various factors can be used to describe the trends of Central American illegal 
migration to the U.S. and Mexico. These factors are organized in four groups: economic 
issues, insecurity and organized crime, social networks, and the state. No single group 
can comprehensively explain the causes of illegal immigration because this phenomenon 
is a mixture between demand, necessity, and opportunity. The combination of the U.S. 
labor market’s demand, drug trafficking and gang violence, weak governments and 
institutions, inequality, poverty, previous migration experience, natural disasters, and the 
state’s campaign of exalting illegal immigrants as heroes makes illegal immigration a 
complex and flexible system. Finally, for many Central Americans, migration is 
perceived not as an alternative, but as the only way to survive.127 The assessment of these 
factors must be the base for the design and implementation of plans and programs to 
regulate illegal immigration. Furthermore, it helps to recognize that not all migration 
flows are equal, and they have to be regulated comprehensively according to their causes 
and consequences.  
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1. Economic Factors 
The economic factors shaping illegal immigration relate to the neoliberal 
economic model being implemented in Central America and a series of pushing and 
pulling factors. First and foremost, the economic liberalization of Central America has 
produced a marginal growth of the economy, and the benefits have been concentrated in a 
small group of people (Figure 4). The traditional core of the Central American economy 
was agriculture, and the neoliberal economic model allowed the monopolization of this 
sector by a minority elite, reducing the amount of land available for rural families and 
curtailing their traditional means for survival.128 Since the mid-2000s, assembly 
manufacturing has replaced agro-exports as the chief engine of the Central American 
economies,129 benefiting only urban populations and motivating rural to urban migration. 
 
Figure 4.  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Mexico and Central America. 
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Economic pushing factors include low wages, insufficient formal-sector 
employment, and inadequate access to credit.130 The World Bank estimates that 34.5 
percent of the El Salvador population, 53.7 percent in Guatemala, and 64.5 percent in 
Honduras, live below the poverty line.131 Furthermore, Honduras and Guatemala remain 
among the most unequal countries in the world (Figure 5).132 Pulling factors are related 
to the economic gap between Central America and the destination countries. The main 
pulling factors are the availability of a labor market, economic opportunities for 
immigrants and their families, and the existence of social safety nets in the United States 
and Mexico.133 Finally, a surplus of people in Central America becomes a commodity, 
selling their labor power according to personal and family evaluations of costs and 
benefits—between staying and trying to survive or emigrating illegally, with the risks of 
being deported and harmed while in transit. Measures implemented to improve the 
economic conditions of origin countries of migration can contribute to reduce the 
incentives of illegal immigrants to move; however economic migrants are just a 
component of the system. 
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Figure 5.  GINI Index in Mexico and Central America. 
2. Social Networks 
Social networks integrated by family and friends in the countries of origin, transit, 
and destinations facilitate the movement of illegal immigrants. They provide funds for 
the journey and to hire the services of professional smugglers; likewise, they provide 
information about routes, location of migration controls, and the means for transportation. 
These networks also provide assistance with lodging and other services while in transit, 
and help migrants in the process of social integration and jobs in the destination 
countries.134 Furthermore, with the strengthening of border controls the pattern of 
circular migration was interrupted, and parents that used to migrate temporarily to the 
United States were forced to stay permanently in that country, leaving their children 
behind. Hence, family reunification has become a powerful motivation for illegal 
immigrants to leave their home countries. 
Different factors have contributed in the development of social networks. First 
were the refugee camps established in Mexico,135 and the legal and illegal migration to 
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the United States during the Central American civil wars.136 Second, the regularization 
programs in Mexico allowed more than 20,000 Central American refugees to became 
permanent residents.137 Third were the establishments of temporary-worker programs in 
Mexico, through which thousands of Guatemalan workers stay in the country every 
year.138 Currently, Central Americans are replacing Mexican workers who are emigrating 
from the southern states of the country to the United States.139 And finally, the 
emergence of civil society organizations during the past fifteen years focused on 
migration issues such as the Migrant’s House (La Casa del Migrante) and Without 
Borders (Sin Fronteras), which provide assistance and safe houses for illegal 
immigrants.140 
3. Insecurity and Organized Crime 
Central American states face daunting problems of governability and violence. 
The region’s location between the largest cocaine producers (Colombia, Bolivia, and 
Peru), the intermediary Mexican drug cartels, and the U.S. drug market makes it a 
strategic transit route for organized crime and all the collateral effects. The presence of 
Mexican Transnational Organized Crime Groups (TOCGs) in Central America has 
created considerable havoc to the already fragile Central American states. The most 
prominent TOCGs are the Sinaloa Federation and the Zetas. Both organizations control 
the principal trafficking routes in Mexico, and have pushed their networks and operations 
into Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.141  For instance, some estimations indicate 
that 75 percent of Guatemala is under the control of the Zetas cartel, with the Sinaloa 
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federation present along Guatemalan borders with Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico 
(Figure 6).142  
 
Figure 6.  Level of Violence and Presence of Organized Crime Groups in 
Central America. 
The incursion of Mexican cartels into Central America has altered the balance of 
power, primarily because of disputes to control territories (plazas) and routes. According 
to David J. Cantor, the spread of Mexican cartels and their influence over traffic routes 
and control of territories produced a harmful effect in their interaction with society.143 A 
2011 report from the World Bank affirms that drug trafficking is the “main single factor 
behind rising violence levels in the region.”144 The report presents statistics about the 
high crime rates in hotspot drug trafficking areas. For example, in Guatemala, homicide 
rates are highest around the capital and in the El Petén region, two areas under the 
Mexican cartels’ influence. In the case of Honduras, homicide rates are highest along the 
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Atlantic coast and the Guatemalan border, which are important routes for drug 
trafficking.145 
The presence of Mexican cartels has exacerbated the violence in Central 
America,146 but another factor that worsened the situation was the deportation of 
criminals from the U.S. to Central America. Between 2001 and 2010, more than 130,000 
people with criminal backgrounds were deported.147 The gangs pose a serious danger to 
the governments in the region due to their size, violent practices, and territorial nature.148 
The combination of Mexican TOCGs and local gangs is part of the reason El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras have three of the five highest homicide rates in the world.149 
Furthermore, since 2000, Guatemala has had one of the world’s highest femicide rates, 
with more than 6,500 reported cases between 2000 and 2011,150 of which the majority of 
victims were young women under the age of 25. 
The Central American gangs are better known as Maras, a term including the 18th 
Street gang or Barrio-18 and their chief rivals, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). No well-
defined profile of current Mara’s members exists because gangs have changed over time. 
However, gang members or “Mareros” can be identified as young with an average entry 
age between 11 and 15 years,151 a culture of violence over seeking prestige, 
unconditional loyalty to the group,152 and a strong attachment to their territory and to 
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local affairs.153 These gangs developed from a combination of factors including armed 
conflicts, poverty, the U.S. deportation policy, social constraints, family fractures, and 
inadequate government response to control them.154 Operations like “Mano Dura” and 
“Operación Escoba” sent hundreds of gangs to prison, where they strengthened their 
relations and recruited new members.155 The availability of weapons from past civil wars 
and the ones provided by drug cartels increased Maras’ capabilities for violence.156 In 
2007, an estimated 4.5 million firearms were in circulation in the region, the large 
majority of which were illegal.157 
Maras’ illegal activities include kidnapping, human and drug trafficking, 
robberies, public disorder, rapes, weapons smuggling, homicides, and extortions.158 They 
operate mainly in urban and sub-urban areas, exercising exclusive control over their 
territories.159 Extortions constitute the Maras’ principal source of revenue. They charge 
shopkeepers, prostitutes, students, public transport operators, and businessmen for the use 
of their territory. Furthermore, the gangs’ violent practices have expanded to prevent 
treason, for revenge, to increase their reputation, intimidate adversaries and authorities, 
force adolescents to join the group, and rape women.160 Statistics show that at least 15 
percent of all homicides in Central America are related to gangs.161 Males between 15 
and 34 years account about 60 percent of all homicide victims, coinciding with the profile 
of the majority of illegal immigrants. 
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Organized crime and illegal immigration interact in at least three forms. First, 
organized crime violence produces forced migration, working as a pushing factor. 
Second, networks of traffickers and smugglers facilitate the movement of illegal 
immigrants providing services from source to destination. Third, the harassment of 
organized crime and gangs along routes works as an inhibitor for migration. In Mexico 
and Central America, Maras and Mexican cartels contribute to shaping legal and illegal 
migration in these three forms.162 
The Maras are promoters, facilitators, and inhibitors of migration. They have a 
smuggling structure to move people within Central America and to the U.S. This network 
has been useful for funding the Maras and to move their own people to the United 
States.163 Maras have presence on the southern border of Mexico and control part of the 
railroad route departing from Chiapas to the U.S.–Mexico border. They have an 
agreement with the Zetas cartel to operate in this part of the route.164 Basically, Maras 
charge a fee for the use of the train and for protection.165 However, the harassment of the 
Maras starts in Central American communities.  
The Maras’ daily activities that produce internal displacement and forced 
migration are betrayal or enmity, resistance, land appropriation, and insecurity.166 
Betrayal can take different forms; first, to cooperate with government authorities and to 
denounce the gang as either victim or witness; and second, collaboration with rival 
criminal organizations. In either case, the punishment for betrayal is, usually, a death 
sentence for the person implicated and sometimes for other members of his or her family. 
Resistance consists of the refusal to pay taxes, either as a war tax or a rent. Those fees are 
justified as a payment for protection, or for the license to maintain a legal business. Other 
forms of resistance are the denial of youngsters to join a clika (groups with few dozen 
members specifically located in each barrio where they enjoy considerable autonomy to 
                                                 
162 Cantor, “Forced Displacement Caused by Organized Crime,” 5. 
163 Farah and Lum, “Central American Gangs,” 12. 
164 Ibid., 10. 
165 UNODC “Transnational Organized Crime in Central America,” 50. 
166 Cantor, “Forced Displacement Caused by Organized Crime,” 12. 
 40
operate), women refusing to attend to a member of the gang, or simply looking scornfully 
at a Marero. In the case of betrayal and resistance, the purpose of the Maras is not to 
displace people; in fact, they need the community to survive, but the collateral effect is 
forced migration. On the contrary, land appropriation has the intention to move people 
from their properties in the interests of the group. Organized crime groups can offer 
unfair amounts of money in exchange for properties, but in other cases, these are just 
taken—with the collaboration of lawyers and authorities with the menace of death, and 
without paying anything. Preferred properties for appropriation are the ones in strategic 
zones close to borders and convenient for moving illicit goods, areas rich in natural 
resources or good for drug production, or houses strategically located to control the barrio 
or community.167  
Insecurity and fear are the tools gangs use to control the community. The feeling 
of insecurity and uncertainty about the future produced by the possible recruitment of a 
child, the rape of a daughter, the loss of property, or the frustration over crime and 
violence are enough incentives to move to another place. Depending on the possibilities, 
families may move to another neighborhood, another city, or even abandon the 
country.168 According to Cantor, causes and victims of forced migration are different 
depending on the type of territory in the Northern Triangle countries. The variables that 
change are the responsibility for violence, the purpose of that violence, and the groups 
involved. These regions are poorer urban and sub-urban areas like the Maras’ core zones, 
wealthier urban areas as the Maras’ extended zones of influence, and rural areas mainly 
under control of transport networks and drug cartels.169 
The closest relationship between gangs and population occurs in poor 
communities or barrios where the Maras reside. These are marginalized areas that Maras 
consider their property. The presence of the state and the provision of security and 
services are limited; therefore, people are subjected in great part to the will of the gangs. 
The highest level of forced migration happens in these areas where people with few 
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resources move to another urban or sub-urban zone in the same city, or they leave to 
another part of the country. Jobs, school, belongings, and the fear of being hunted if they 
leave keep them from moving. For instance, an internal displacement of about 2.1 percent 
of the population in 2012 was reported in El Salvador, and people sometimes have to 
move several times.170  
Usually, the movement of people from one barrio to another just means the switch 
from the harassment of one clika to another, with just a short-term improvement of their 
security condition. In their new residency, they still have to pay taxes to gangs and are 
subjected to violence, sometimes under the worst conditions. The clika in the community 
can consider the new arrivals as spies from another clika or as deserters from its own 
Mara in the city, and they can kill them or force them to move again. Forced 
displacement is not necessarily outside the country, but under some conditions it is. If 
people have the resources, family in another country, or the pressure is too much, they 
emigrate illegally.171 According to the UNHCR, roughly 17,000 refugee and asylum-
seekers from the Northern Triangle countries are in the U.S. and other Latin American 
and European countries. This information is illustrative but not conclusive because many 
forced migrants do not request refugee status.172 
In wealthier urban areas, the trend is different. The presence of Maras in these 
communities is lower; therefore, displacement does not occur as a response to daily 
harassment but rather because of extortions and the perception of insecurity. In some 
cases, the community hires private security to protect families and businesses, but 
sometimes it is not enough to prevent forced migration. With forced displacement from 
wealthy areas, it is not only the exodus of people, but investments and businesses also 
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leave the country, causing even worse economic conditions for the region.173 The direct 
cost of insecurity is high, representing 8.9 percent of the annual GDP in Mexico, and an 
average of 7.7 percent in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. In Mexico, an estimated 
80 percent of these costs are borne by individuals and private companies.174 
The Zetas cartel plays a prominent role in controlling illegal immigration. As 
inhibitors of migration, this organization controls the northern part of the railroad from 
the southern states of Mexico to the border with the U.S. They charge a fee for the use of 
the train and for protection. However, when needed, they kidnap immigrants for 
exploitation or to force them to become assassins for the cartel. According to the 
UNODC, the Zetas have produced a change of immigration trends, shifting their points of 
entry into the U.S. from Texas to Arizona and the Rio Grande Valley.175 As promoters of 
forced migration, the Zetas’ presence in the Northern Triangle to control territories and 
routes increases the level of violence in the region and the displacement from the areas 
they want.176 The Zetas have control over territories in El Petén, Alto Verapaz, and some 
towns in Huehuetenango, forcing people in those regions to cooperate or to perish.177 
Using Guatemala as an example of the relationship between forced migration and 
organized crime, one can identify a connection between risk zones, expelling zones, high 
homicide-rate areas, and main roads (Figure 7). The highest levels of criminality are 
located in the strategic territories under the control of organized crime. These are urban 
or rural zones, but in general include border areas between Honduras and Guatemala and 
between Guatemala and Mexico used for trafficking, coastal zones in the Izabal 
department of Honduras, where shipments of drugs arrive by plane or fast boats, and the 
interceptions between freeways and cities.178 
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Figure 7.  Forced Displacement and Main Highways in Guatemala 
4. The Role of the State 
According to Laura Gonzalez-Murphy, “state actions have a major impact on the 
size, direction, and effects of migration flows.”179 However, origin, transit, and 
destination countries play different roles. In the case of Central American origin 
countries, they are interested in three issues. First, the movement of surplus population 
out of the country provides short-term relief for poor economic conditions, social 
upheaval, and unemployment. Second, these states lobby transit and destination countries 
for the protection of their nationals, and for the implementation of regularization and 
temporary worker programs. Finally, they are interested in the continuity of migration 
because of the benefits that remittances represent for the country’s economy and the 
survival of some sectors of its population. In 2013, for example, remittances in Latin 
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America reached $61.3 billon dollars.180 Mexico was the largest receiver with $21.6 
billion, Guatemala occupied the second place with $5.1 billion, El Salvador the forth 
place with $3.96 billion, and Honduras the sixth place with $3.12 billion.181 These 
remittances represented 1.7 percent of the GDP in Mexico, 28 percent of the GDP in 
Honduras, 17 percent in El Salvador, and 9 percent in Guatemala.182 Due to the 
dependence of Central American countries on remittances, governments tend to exalt 
migrants as heroes because they leave home on behalf of their families.183 Therefore, any 
measure implemented by transit and destination countries will be highly opposed by 
origin countries whose economy depends greatly on remittances, and whose social 
stability depends in part on the relief of people’s mobility. 
Transit and destination countries design migration policies to regulate who has the 
right to be admitted or stay and under which circumstances, and the activities they are 
allowed to carry out. These countries implement migration restrictions along the borders 
and inside their territories to filter out the legal from the illegal immigrants and to expel 
the undesirable. Furthermore, they create labor markets to admit migrants according to 
the interests of the country.184 For instance, Mexico, acting as emigration and transit 
country, reformed migration laws to decriminalize illegal migration and to recognize the 
human and legal rights of migrants.185 Mexico even considered granting humanitarian 
visas for transit migrants, giving them broader access to means for transportation and 
legal protection.186 
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Each destination country implements immigration policies for convenience, 
prioritizing economic interests, social issues, humanitarian concerns, or security factors. 
For instance, the United States, as the main destination country for Central American 
migration, has embraced restrictive policies based on “prevention through deterrence” 
and “enforcement with consequences.”187 To implement these policies, the United States 
relies on massive expenditures, the increase of Border Patrol agents, the deployment of 
the National Guard, and the use of technology. The U.S. budget for border security and 
illegal immigration enforcement increased from $7.4 billion in 2002 to almost  
$17.2 billion in 2010; the number of border patrol agents commissioned on the U.S.–
Mexico border grew from 3,555 agents in 1992 to 21,394 border patrol officers, 21,790 
Customs and Border Protection agents, and 1,580 canine enforcement teams in 2013.188 
Furthermore, nearly 2,100 National Guard soldiers have helped to secure U.S. borders 
since 2010.189 The technology deployed to enforce migration policies includes 
surveillance systems, sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, information and 
communications systems, and virtual fences.190 
During the twentieth century, the U.S. foreign policy towards Central America 
had considerable impact on past and current illegal immigration patterns. According to 
Salvador Martí i Puig and Diego Sánchez-Ancochea, the United States supported the 
military regime in El Salvador during the civil war in the 1980s and assisted the Efraín 
Ríos regime in Guatemala, providing training and resources during the state-led genocide 
of indigenous groups. Moreover, it supported the Contras in Nicaragua and 
simultaneously weakened the Sandinista regime through economic warfare.191 The 
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economic and human costs as a consequence, in part, of the U.S. intervention in Central 
American during the civil wars were considerable. For example, in El Salvador, 
extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, rape, and torture cost 75,000 lives. In 
Nicaragua, 30,000 were killed, and in Guatemalan, there were more than 250,000 deaths 
and 500,000 displaced.192 Hence, measures implemented in origin, transit, and 
destination countries shape illegal immigration and have intended and non-intended 
consequences. 
D. THE CENTRAL AMERICAN NORTHERN TRIANGLE 
There are some peculiarities among the development of emigration patterns in the 
countries of the Central America Northern Triangle. For instance, civil war in Guatemala 
had its worst effects on indigenous groups; emigration in Honduras started later than in 
the rest of the countries; and the military regime and migrants from El Salvador enjoyed 
more support from the United States. Furthermore, the proximity with Mexico played an 
important role on shaping migration patterns in Central America. 
1. Guatemala 
Emigration in Guatemala started during the 1950s, influenced by the development 
of communications infrastructure, airlines, the installation of telephone lines, and the 
presence of U.S. companies. During that time, the drivers of Guatemalan migration were 
the possibility of studying in the United States, the demand for labor in certain services, 
better wages, and the relative freedom to emigrate.193 During the 1970s, economic 
problems worsened by the 1976 earthquake, which left considerable human and material 
damage, and increased Guatemalan migration flows. Between 1970 and 1979, the number 
of Guatemalans residing in the United States reached 23,837.194  
The economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, and the high levels of violence due 
to the civil, war resulted in international emigration without precedence. This migration 
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followed three different patterns. The first flow was directed towards Mexico, in which 
approximately 200,000 people migrated, taking advantage of the proximity, shared 
culture, and the openness of the border. The second flow went to the United States. The 
labor demand in the United States during this period in the construction, service, and 
agriculture sectors pulled thousands of Guatemalan migrants.195 By the end of the 
twentieth century, almost 500,000 Guatemalans resided in the United States. The third 
pattern consisted of migration to Central American countries, mainly to Belize and Costa 
Rica.196 
The highest emigration growth took place between 2000 and 2010, with 671,722 
new Guatemalan migrants arriving at the United States, representing an increase of 180.3 
percent compared with the previous decade.197 According to the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), in 2010, the number of Guatemalan immigrants in the 
United States reached 1,637,119, equivalent to 11.4 percent of the total population of 
Guatemala,198from which up to 60 percent may be undocumented.199 
Inequality and violence in Guatemala are unresolved issues, producing high rates 
of emigration. The signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996 did little to reduce 
poverty, racism against the ethnic Mayans, impunity, and economic vulnerability.200 
Guatemala produces up to 35 percent of all the wealth in Central America, but this is not 
translated into economic benefits for the majority of the population. Unemployment and 
underemployment are considerable, and almost 75 percent of the workforce participates 
in the informal sector.201 The creation of well-paid jobs and training to produce high-
skilled workers has not been among the priorities for Guatemalan governments.202 A 
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considerable portion of the population relies on remittances to meet basic needs and 
surpass the poverty line.203 
2. Honduras 
The patterns of migration in Honduras were unlike those developed in the other 
countries of Central America. Honduran emigration began discretely during the 1960s 
with the growth of the coffee, cattle, and cotton industries; because of the need for large 
portions of land, a widespread internal displacement was produced in the southern part of 
the country.204 The violence, economic crises, and political instability recurrent in 
Central America during the 1980s affected Honduras to a lesser extent; therefore, during 
this period it behaved more as a receiving country for refugees than an emigration 
country. Therefore, Hondurans neither participated in the regularization program of 
illegal immigrants under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 nor 
created the social networks that facilitate illegal immigration. Honduran emigration to the 
United States basically began during the late 1990s, growing from approximately 
109,000 in 1990 to 283,000 in 2000.205 One of the events that provoked the acceleration 
of Honduran migration was Hurricane Mitch in October 1998, which destroyed tobacco, 
banana, and coffee-growing regions, and caused the loss of at least 17,000 jobs.206  
Honduran emigration continued at a rapid pace, experiencing a 132-percent 
increase from 2000 to 2011. According to the Census Bureau’s American Community 
Survey, in 2011, 702,000 Hondurans resided in the United States,207 although other 
estimations raise that number to 1.2 million of migrants, with 185,000 people leaving 
Honduras each year.208 In 2012, the number of Hondurans deported from the United 
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States reached 32,240,209 and the ones deported from Mexico were 28,020, making up 37 
percent of total deportees.210 Current Honduran migration trends are related to political 
conflicts,211 corruption, unemployment, poverty, inequality, and insecurity.212 According 
to Daniel Reichman, “Migration has become a path to development, rather than a 
symptom of its failure.”213 Remittances are an important component of the Honduran 
economy. In 2011, they comprised 17 percent of the entire economy of the country; 
likewise, these resources are crucial for the survival of the impoverished population.  
3. El Salvador 
The process of emigration in El Salvador started as a consequence of the civil 
war. It displaced one-sixth of the population (1 million people),214 and left a balance of 
75,000 dead, comparable with the casualties of the U.S. Civil War.215 Some Salvadorans 
sought refuge in the regions of the country not involved in the war; others migrated to 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, and another group moved to the United States 
through Mexico. The United States authorized the entrance of waves of Salvadorans into 
the country as a relief from the civil war; however, these migrants did not receive the 
status of refugees or permanent migrants because of the support of the U.S. government 
to the military regime. Between 1970 and 1980, there was a 73-percent increase of 
Salvadoran migration, and from 1979 to 1988 the number of emigrants to the United 
States reached 500,000 Salvadorans, with thousands more moving to Canada.216  
After the end of the civil war, the social, economic, and political conditions in El 
Salvador did not improve. The amount of arable land available was insufficient for all the 
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families historically living from agriculture; furthermore, the prices of agricultural 
products and the level and availability of wages plummeted. Actually, nearly 2 million 
Salvadoran-born migrants are residing in the United States.217 
E. CONCLUSION 
From the information presented in this chapter, it is possible to conclude that 
Mexico’s multifaceted character as a country of immigration and transit increases the 
difficulty to regulate illegal immigration on the southern border of the country. Mexico is 
in a situation in which it has to stop Central American illegal immigration from reaching 
the United States, and simultaneously, it has to guarantee the human rights and integrity 
of those migrants. On one hand, Mexico apprehends as many Central American illegal 
immigrants as does the United States. Yet it decriminalized illegal immigration, 
demonstrating the compromise with regulation and protection, and simultaneously, the 
ineffectiveness of migration controls on the Mexican southern border.  
The causes of Central American illegal immigration are diverse, including 
economic, social, political, and security factors. Their influence over illegal immigration 
patterns has varied according to the circumstances in origin and destination countries; 
therefore, any policy implemented to regulate migration must consider the combination 
of all conditions producing it. Security issues dominated during the twentieth century 
because of civil wars in Central America; however, globalization and economic 
interdependence have balanced the relationship between the factors that motivate 
migration. Currently, the number of illegal immigrants getting into the United States to 
Mexico is on the rise. The economic gap between North and Central America, and the 
violence generated by the presence of Mexican cartels and gangs make it less likely that 
illegal immigration can be controlled. 
Given the background on transit migration and the causes and trends of Central 
America illegal immigration, the next chapter depicts the Mexican southern border and 
its relationship with migration flows. This border is described considering its 
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configuration, legal and illegal points of entry, and communication networks. Further 
explanation is focuses on the main routes, and the means for transportation and services 
used by illegal immigrants to cross the southern region of Mexico to reach the United 
States. The chapter also covers the risks and threats that Central American illegal 
immigrants have to face while in transit through Mexico. 
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III. THE SOUTHERN BORDER OF MEXICO, ITS MIGRATION 
ROUTES AND TRAPS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the southern border of Mexico as a 
platform for migration, the migration routes throughout the southern region of the 
country, and the factors shaping those routes, which in turn, have complicated the 
regulation of illegal immigration. Furthermore, the description of risks and threats 
migrants encounter along these routes are identified because Mexico has the 
responsibility to provide security of citizens and migrants equally. These issues relate to 
the gap between plans and programs to regulate illegal immigration on the southern 
border of Mexico, and their outcomes, because they represent the points of intervention 
for the regulation and the protection of illegal immigrants. This chapter first describes the 
main features of the southern border of Mexico and its historical evolution. Subsequently, 
the factors shaping points of entry and migration routes for illegal immigration 
throughout the country are explained, emphasizing the role of the state, social networks 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), cost, organized crime, and natural 
disasters. Then, the principal migration routes are identified, including Central American 
corridors, the Pacific, Center, Jungle, and Golf and Caribbean. Moreover, the risks and 
threats against illegal immigrants are depicted. Finally, conclusions are presented. 
Although the transit of migrants through the southern border of Mexico is not 
comparable to that of the U.S.–Mexico border, the level of informal crossings and the 
number of illegal immigrants using that border to undertake their journey north are 
significant. Without including informal crossings between border communities, an 
estimated 1.9 million migrants cross the Mexico–Central America border. Studies show 
that 83 percent of these are legal entries of migrants as local visitors, tourists, and 
temporary workers registered by the National Immigration Institute (INM), 9 percent are 
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irregular entries of Central American migrants heading to the United States, and 8 percent 
are informal visitors or workers heading to Chiapas or other Mexican southern states.218 
Illegal immigrants use the southern border of Mexico for their benefit, defining 
points of entry, platforms, nodes, and passageways according to various factors. For 
instance, policies implemented in transit and destination countries to secure borders 
determine illegal immigrant routes and their adaptation. Likewise, the economic and 
social resources available to migrants—accessible transportation, natural disasters, the 
support of non-state actors, corruption, and the violence related to organized crime—are 
issues shaping migration routes. According to these factors, illegal immigrants select the 
safest route, evading the authorities, hiding from organized crime, and obtaining 
resources for their journey.219  
A. THE SOUTHERN BORDER OF MEXICO 
The establishment of the southern border of Mexico started during the 1800s 
when Mexico and Guatemala consolidated their independence. However, the border 
between both countries was under dispute because, until 1824, Chiapas was part of 
Guatemala.220 The territorial claims were settled on September 27, 1882, with the signing 
of the Mariscal–Herrera Treaty of Limits.221 The new border separated the territories of 
Mexico and Guatemala, but it did not divide the cultural, ethnic, social, and economic 
relations between both countries.222 
The development of the border continued during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries with the discovery of natural and economic resources in Chiapas. 
During this period, coffee plantations in the Soconusco province grew substantially, 
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producing significant migration of Guatemalan workers to the region. This flow 
throughout the last century intensified the cross-border life and diluted the border.223 
According to Ann Kimbal, the southern border of Mexico during the twentieth century 
“was not much of a reality,”224 because border controls did not exist or were not 
enforced, regional trade was strong, and social relations took priority beyond identity or 
nationality.225 
The Mexican government began to consider the southern border of the country a 
matter of national security in response to a combination of international and domestic 
issues. At the international level, the factors involved were the civil wars in Central 
America and the refugee crisis, increased illegal migration of Central Americans to the 
United States, U.S. border security measures after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the 
growing presence of Central American gangs in Mexico. At the local level, Mexico’s 
interest in the economic integration of North America, the war against organized crime, 
and the emergence of guerrillas as the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) 
shaped the restrictive controls and militarization of the southern border of the country.226 
The civil wars in Central America during the 1970s and 1990s resulted in mass 
migration to Mexico and the establishment of refugee camps.227 This period was chaotic 
for the management of the border because multitudes of Central Americans seeking 
refuge in Mexico entered the country without control, and because of Guatemalan’s 
unauthorized military incursions into Mexican territory to pursue insurgents. 
Furthermore, the first networks of human smugglers (coyotes) emerged with the 
opportunity to make a business out of refugees trying to reach the United States.228 At the 
end of the civil wars, large numbers of refugees were peacefully returned to their 
countries, but they left behind permanent bonds that helped in the development of the 
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first networks in the movement of illegal immigrants, the trafficking of drugs, and the 
smuggling of weapons.229 The belief that insurgent movements could spillover into 
Mexico raised concerns for the control of the southern border. However, the issue that 
triggered a tighter control of the border was the uprising of the EZLN in 1994.230 The 
Zapatista rebellion compelled the federal government to militarize the southern region of 
the country with a substantial increase in military bases in Chiapas, and with the 
establishment of Advanced Naval Stations (ENAs) along the Suchiate and Rio Hondo 
rivers.231 
As a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States pressured Mexico to 
strengthen controls over its southern border.232 The United States feared crossings by the 
Palestine Diasporas in Central American countries, and the relations between some of 
these governments and the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (OLP).233 U.S. 
security officials believe that terrorist organizations and weapons of mass destruction 
could easily enter Mexico and reach the United States with few complications. 
Consequently, Mexico increased the presence of security agencies in the southern region 
of the country, thickening the border with the implementation of belts of controls. With 
these restrictions, Central American migrants adapted their tactics, establishing more 
isolated and dangerous migration routes and more frequently using the services of 
professional smugglers to cross Mexico.234 Furthermore, other security concerns, such as 
transnational organized crime and the recurrent presence of Central American gangs in 
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Mexico, revealed the vulnerability and lack of control of the southern border of the 
country.235  
1. General Characteristics 
The southern border of Mexico is as diverse and complex as the illegal 
immigrants trying to cross it. It comprises 1,139 kilometers, of which 963 are shared with 
Guatemala and 176 with Belize.236 The geography of this borderland is heterogeneous, 
including flat zones, river basins, inaccessible mountain areas, and impenetrable jungles 
where the border is barely signaled by a furrow in the ground.237 Furthermore, the 
tropical climate, high temperatures, and 80-percent humidity characterize the difficult 
environment in this border area. For trade and transit, these conditions limit the legal 
exchange of goods and people, and hinder the effective control of the border. In turn, they 
constitute fertile ground for illicit activities related to drug trafficking, weapons 
smuggling, and illegal immigration.238 
The dynamics on the Mexico–Guatemala border vary according to the 
characteristics of the region. Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and Quintana Roo are the 
Mexican border states. In Guatemala, the states that comprise the border are San Marcos, 
Huehuetenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, and Petén (Figure 8). For instance, in Campeche, 
where the jungle is predominant, the formal crossing of people is low and irregular; it is 
difficult to access, transportation infrastructure is limited, and the level of population is 
reduced, despite the considerable number of human settlements along the border. This 
region is frequently used for illicit activities like trafficking of drugs, humans, and 
precious woods. In contrast, the construction of the freeway from El Naranjo to El Ceibo, 
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on the border with Tabasco, intensified illegal immigration.239 Chiapas is the most 
important state for the entry, transit, and deportation for Central American illegal 
immigrants.240 Migration flows are concentrated in the communities of the Pacific, 
characterized by higher labor and commercial interactions, greater border communities, 
and more extensive transportation networks, including highways, ports, and railroads.241 
 
Figure 8.  Configuration of the Southern Border of México. 
The Belize–Mexico border can be called a “liquid border” because the Hondo 
River basin defines it.242 According to Ana E. Cervera Molina, this border is articulated 
as an insular region characterized by its porosity and cultural distinctiveness with Mexico 
and the rest of Central America.243 The main point of entry between both countries is the 
bridge Subteniente López in the city of Chetumal. Local visitors and tourists make up the 
bulk of migration flow, and the displacement of Belizean temporary workers is almost 
nonexistent; therefore, the relationship between the two countries is essentially 
commercial.244 
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In sum, among the most significant features of the Mexico–Central America 
border are the highly dispersed settlements, a low level of social development and quality 
of life, a prevalence of informal economic activities and underdevelopment, and high 
vulnerability and porosity, all of which complicate the control of that border and the 
regulation of flows of people and goods. Furthermore, the southern region of Mexico has 
little participation in public policies and in the national economy, difficulty in the 
provision of public services and infrastructure development, elevated levels of insecurity, 
high rates of poverty, social exclusion, and weak state presence.245 As Ivan Briscoe 
argues, the instability in the southern region of Mexico has been inherited from the 
historical centralization of the country, resulting in a tenuous grip on the periphery.246 
2. The Presence of the State 
The infrastructure to regulate immigration flows on the southern border of 
Mexico is limited. For instance, there are only ten legal Points of Entry (POEs), of which 
seven are located in Chiapas, one in Tabasco, and two in Quintana Roo, and no legal 
POE exists in the border state of Campeche (Figure 9). Furthermore, these border posts 
have few resources and personnel to fulfill the basic function of an international POE.247 
In contrast, there are more than 350 informal POEs, including pedestrian and vehicular 
crossings.248 The informal flows of people and goods coexist with the formal ones, with 
the tacit consent of the state. For Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Doris Meissner, and 
Eleanor Sohnen, the challenge for controlling this border is to allow informal flows to a 
certain degree in coherence with the historical relations between border communities, 
while gradually integrating those flows into legal pathways.249 
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Figure 9.  Legal and Illegal Points of Entry (POEs). 
The socioeconomic and cultural similarities in the borderland have allowed the 
loosening of migration controls along the border; instead, the Mexican government has 
positioned infrastructure and resources for the regulation of illegal immigration in what 
can be identified as a “vertical border.”250 That is, mobile and fixed checkpoints placed at 
strategic points, forming belts of control so that the border is thickened.251 These control 
tiers are fixed in three planes. The first one consists on legal POEs, fixed and mobile 
checkpoints, and patrols of migration and security agencies. The second one is located 
approximately thirty miles from the border and includes posts on the main roads crossing 
through Huixtla, Suchiate, Arriaga, Trinitaria, Comitán, Benemérito de las Américas, and 
Palenque. The last layer is located at about one hundred miles, and the third is placed 
along the Isthmus of Tehuántepec (Figure 10).252 Checkpoints are located at the main 
highways heading north, hindering the transit of illegal immigrants through the southern 
region of Mexico. In contrast, the surveillance along dirt routes and railways is 
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limited.253 With this approximation, the flows along the borderland are relatively free, 
but more restrictive along the principal highways.  
 
Figure 10.  Belts of Control on the Southern Border of Mexico. 
Different agencies participate in the operation of the checkpoints for the 
regulation of illegal immigration; however, coordination is absent, and the functions of 
these posts and the resources employed are duplicated. For instance, along the highway 
between Tapachula and Arriaga, up to eight checkpoints may be found, and are 
administered by diverse agencies.254 Every few miles, public and private vehicles are 
stopped for inspection and the verification of the passengers’ migration status. The 
agencies with checkpoints include the Federal Police, the Chiapas State Police, the Army, 
the Navy, the National Migration Institute, Customs, and the Federal Attorney General’s 
Office (PGR).255 In the most isolated parts of the border, the Mexican Navy has 
Advanced Naval Stations (ENAs);256 however, this institution does not have the authority 
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to verify an individual’s migration status and detain illegal immigrants.257 The presence 
of the Mexican armed forces along the southern border is oriented to fight drug 
trafficking and weapons smuggling. Despite their involvement to verify the migratory 
status of people crossing their posts, they do not have specific operations and resources to 
stop illegal immigrants. Furthermore, military patrols and checkpoints are limited or 
nonexistent close to the autonomous indigenous communities where they are viewed with 
distrust as a result of the suppression of the 1990’s guerrilla movements.258 
Another feature of the regulation of migration flows is the detention centers. 
Currently, 32 of these centers exist throughout Mexico. Furthermore, the National 
Migration Institute has established 15 provisional stations type A that provide for the 
detention of migrants for a maximum of 48 hours, and 12 provisional stations type B that 
provide for a maximum detention of seven days.259 Most centers are located in the 
southern states of the country, particularly, in the cities with connections to important 
transport routes, harbors, and airports, indicating the intent to stop illegal immigration in 
this region.260 The National Migration Institute administers detention centers, which are 
dedicated facilities for the custody of illegal immigrants pending their deportation or the 
regularization of their migratory status. Detention centers are vulnerable to the intrusion 
of heavily armed groups looking to kidnap migrants, because the institute as responsible 
to provide security against that threat lacks the resources to do it.  
The presence of migration authorities along the southern border of Mexico is 
limited. There are only 125 migration officers assigned to cover the 1,139 kilometers of 
the border.261 In 1990 the National Migration Institute created a migrant protection group 
                                                 
257 Cámara de Diputados, “Ley de Migración,” accessed September 10, 2014.  
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LMigra.pdf 
258 CNN Mexico, “Indígenas de Chiapas Retienen a Militares Tras Operativo de Vigilancia,” last 
updated March 19, 2013, http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2013/03/19/indigenas-de-chiapas-retienen-a-
militares-tras-operativo-de-vigilancia. 
259 Sin Fronteras IAP, “La Ruta del Encierro: Situación de las Personas en Detención en Estaciones 
Migratorias y en Estancias Provisionales,” (Mexico, D.F., 2013), 15, accessed July 12, 2014.  
http://sinfronteras.org.mx/attachments/informe-2014.pdf. 
260 Rodolfo R. Casillas, “Las Rutas de los Centroamericanos por México, un Ejercicio de 
Caracterización, Actores Principales y Complejidades,” Migración y Desarrollo (2008): 162. 
261 Benítez Manaut, “Migración y Seguridad,” 181. 
 63
known as “Beta.” It has the purpose to provide humanitarian aid, medical assistance, and 
guidance about their rights. Of the eight Beta Group offices in the country only two are 
located in the southern region. The headquarters of these groups are Tapachula and 
Comitán, from where 47 Beta agents patrol the borderland, rescuing migrants and 
providing assistance.262 In 2011 alone, this organization helped more than 5,600 migrants 
in danger and provided basic guidance to 286,868 migrants.263 The contrast between the 
reduced number of migration agents operating on the southern border of Mexico and the 
existence of Beta groups to guide and rescue migrants, illustrates the country’s 
inconsistency and duality of border policies and illegal immigration controls.  
B. MIGRATION ROUTES 
Illegal immigrants do not build new roads; instead, they use resources at hand to 
cross borders and territories, adapting their routes and means for transportation according 
to various factors. These include restrictions that states implement to secure borders, 
financial resources available to migrants in relation to the cost of their journey north, 
social networks supporting the movement of migrants, natural disasters, and exploitation 
of organized crime over illegal immigrants. Border controls are obstacles, but not 
necessarily impediments. They can be overcome by changing routes to evade the 
authorities or by paying bribes. Central Americans have a culture of migration; from 
generation to generation, they have transmitted the knowledge and tradition to emigrate 
north. Social networks provide migrants with financial support and insight into what they 
may experience. Natural disasters destroy existing routes and open new ones; illegal 
immigrants use what is available to them.264 Finally, the same organized crime violence 
that produces forced migration in origin countries is present in migration routes, 
functioning as a deterrent and as an obstacle for illegal immigrants to be evaded. 
The Mexican government has not closed its southern border for several reasons. 
As explained previously, the social, economic, and cultural relations between border 
                                                 
262 Grayson, “Mexico’s Forgotten Southern Border.”  
263 González-Murphy, Protecting Immigration Rights, 58, 9. 
264 Casillas, “Las Rutas de los Centroamericanos,” 165. 
 64
communities make difficult to divide something that goes beyond nationality. 
Furthermore, the informal flow of people and goods provide a relief valve for the 
precarious conditions of those communities. Therefore, the assessment of the southern 
border of Mexico as a line is useless to explain why government efforts have failed to 
regulate illegal immigration. Since the Mexican government has allowed regional 
migration and has restricted transit migration, an analysis of migration routes and the 
factors defining them is fundamental. With the knowledge of migration routes, then 
government’s efforts can be oriented to regulate flows in the points that are most cost-
effective and can adequate its operations according to the change in factors defining those 
routes. 
1. The State 
Migration routes can be continuous or permanent, depending on the involvement 
of the state to stop illegal immigration along the border and in the interior of the country, 
and the measures to facilitate legal entry. Specific actions of the Mexican government 
shape migration routes: the establishment of checkpoints in strategic locations and along 
highways, train stations, harbors, and airports;265 the rotation and removal of immigration 
authorities; the simplification of processes to grant visas; and the construction of roads 
and border infrastructure.266 Other factors related to the state’s efforts to define migration 
routes include the implementation of temporary worker and regularization programs, 
international agreements related to migration issues and deportation processes, and the 
corruption of migration authorities. 
Due to the restrictions and controls that the Mexican government implements in 
the southern region of the country, the probability of migrants being detected is quite 
high if they are using common transportation, such as buses or particular vehicles. 
Therefore, illegal immigrants use a variety of means for transportation and illicit services 
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whose conditions endanger their lives. 267 For instance, the use of freight trains has 
become popular because the presence of migration checkpoints on the railways is much 
less in comparison to highways.268 Furthermore, increasing legal and administrative 
barriers for obtaining visas led to the development of social, humanitarian, and illegal 
processes to support and exploit migration flows. These factors partly explain the 
diversity of migration routes and the formal and informal actors participating in migration 
processes.269 
Checkpoints along highways produce variations in migration routes. In contrast, 
the presence of migration authorities on the border is symbolic since some informal 
crossings are located near legal POEs and blatantly visible. One in particular is the 
presence of military posts and patrols along the border. Although the armed forces do not 
have the ability to enforce migration laws, their mere presence deters illegal 
immigrants.270 Another factor is the belt of control placed in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. 
This area is the narrowest section of the Mexican territory, with a length of only 210 
kilometers from coast to coast. It represents a bottleneck for migration flows, and a 
strategic area for the control of migrations. For instance, 80 percent of illegal 
immigration apprehensions in the Mexican territory occur in this area.271 
Illegal immigrants and professional smugglers are aware of the methods used by 
migration and security agencies to control the border and regulate migration. Fixed posts 
are perfectly identified, and mobile checkpoints are usually located in main highways, 
with easily signs noticeable at long distances. Therefore, government response has to be 
as adaptable as illegal immigration.  
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2. Organized Crime 
Some factors related to organized crime have produced a change in illegal 
immigration routes. First, these routes overlap at some level with the trafficking of drugs 
from South America to the United States, making immigrants more visible and 
vulnerable to exploitation. Second, in parts of the country, criminal organizations have 
replaced the state or operate in collusion with members of security and migration 
agencies in charge of controlling the border and regulating illegal immigration. Finally, 
the illicit condition of Central American migrants makes them the perfect prey for 
organized crime groups since they are not willing to report abuses and violations for fear 
of being deported.272  
Professional smugglers, Central American gangs, and Mexican cartels play an 
important role in defining migration routes.273 Networks of professional smugglers or 
coyotes transport illegal immigrants, but at certain costs and under some level of 
uncertainty and insecurity. These organizations are usually families or friends who have 
an infrastructure to accommodate and transport immigrants, and connections with corrupt 
officials who allow free movement. Furthermore, coyotes must have the consent of 
powerful organized crime groups, like the Zetas cartel, to operate along their routes. 
Another group participating in illegal immigration is the Maras. They have a smuggling 
structure to move people from Central America to the U.S.,274 and force migrants to use 
their services, to pay a fee for the use of the train, or to provide sexual services to gang 
members. The participation of Zetas with illegal immigrants is more precise and ruthless. 
They kidnap immigrants for exploitation, requesting ransom to their families in the 
United States or in their countries of origin.  
Organized crime, illegal immigrants, and the state create a game in which one 
player’s moves have direct implications on the others. For instance, illegal immigrants 
face the dilemma of using standard routes and means for transportation—putting 
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themselves at risk of being apprehended by migration authorities—or following more 
isolated routes with the danger of falling in the hands of organized crime. The Mexican 
government must regulate and protect migrants from organized crime and from corrupt 
officials. Organized crime takes advantage of the inefficacy of the government and the 
necessity of illegal immigrants. 
3. Cost 
Resources available to migrate north are a decisive factor in selecting a route to be 
used to reach the United States through Mexico. As Ann Kimbal explains, money cannot 
circumvent all immigration policies;275 however, it helps in the selection of the route, 
transportation, and services used to make their journey safer and faster. The most 
vulnerable migrants are the ones without resources to hire a smuggler, to pay the fees for 
the use of freight trains to gangs, to buy the protection of organized crime and corrupt 
officials, or just to pay for food and lodging. Migrants with limited resources move along 
migration routes step-by-step, using the support of non-state organizations and working 
to obtain money for their journey.276 In contrast, with enough financial resources, 
migrants can buy fake migration documents and purchase an airplane ticket from Cancún 
or Tapachula to a city in the north of Mexico, saving lots of trouble. 
The preferred or only available means of transportation in southern Mexico for 
illegal immigrants without economic resources is the Chiapas-Mayab train, better known 
as “La Bestia.” If for any reason this transport is out of service, migrants without 
economic resources can take different paths. First, they walk long distances through 
inhospitable roads to continue their journey, evading migration checkpoints. Second, they 
just surrender to migration authorities to be deported to their home countries. Finally, 
they can wait, using the time to build social networks and to obtain resources. It is 
possible to observe the concentration of Central American migrants in the principal 
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railway nodes such as Tenosique or Arriaga when the train is out of service.277 In sum, 
illegal immigrants decide when and how to migrate according their available cash. 
The Mexican Secretary of the Interior (SEGOB) announced that it would establish 
controls to prevent illegal immigrants from risking their lives by using freight trains to 
travel north. The National Migration Institute argues that since August 2014, it maintains 
permanent surveillance of the railroads along Chiapas.278 This measure will have awful 
consequences over illegal immigrants with fewer resources because they will not desist 
on trying to reach the United States, and for that purpose, they will use other means as 
walking longer distances or cooperate with organized crime that use the most isolated 
routes in exchange for a ride. Therefore, taking migrants out of the train will not help to 
regulate illegal immigration or protect migrants, since they will adapt their methods to 
riskier and more inaccessible routes where not even humanitarian organizations can help 
them. Taking illegal immigrants out of the train will only make the precarious conditions 
of migrants less evident.  
4. Social Networks and Non-governmental Organizations  
Over time, illegal immigrants have learned about routes and their threats, places 
for shelter, and temporary jobs. They have changed routes according to the vicissitudes of 
the journey by generating relations with humanitarian organizations, networks of 
traffickers, and migration authorities to receive assistance, or to avoid them when 
possible and necessary. According to Rodolfo Casillas, the development of social 
networks compensates for the lack of institutional power in the hands of migrants.279 
Finally, social networks represent a way to reduce the costs and risks to migrate, because 
they allow the exchange of information about migration checkpoints, the presence of 
organized crime, the condition of transportation, and places to rest. 
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A consideration illegal immigrants use to plan their routes is the location of 
shelters such as The Migrant’s House (La Casa del Migrante). This organization is part of 
a larger network of safe houses, with 47 of them throughout Mexico, located mainly 
along the migratory routes.280 Their purpose is to provide shelter, food, spiritual counsel, 
and medical assistance to the greatest extent possible. Furthermore, they are the principal 
advocates of the human rights of migrants.281 Usually, illegal immigrants retreat to safe 
houses for shelter and to flee from migration authorities and criminals. Migration officers 
are not allowed to pursue illegal immigrants inside the safe houses in accordance with 
humanitarian principles.282 The impact of non-state actors is considerable because of the 
number of migrants supported. A safe house can provide assistance to as many as 36,500 
migrants per year.283  
Migration shelters represent a guide indicating the path to follow for migrants. 
They jump from shelter to shelter for protection and help. The government allows the 
existence of these places for humanitarian reasons, but if the intention would be to 
eradicate illegal immigration, then a good starting point is to close them. Authorities are 
aware of the relevance of NGOs to reduce, for at least a moment, the suffering of 
migrants. But they can also provide information to the government for improving 
processes to protect and regulate migration. 
5. Natural Disasters 
Natural disasters such as hurricanes and floods modify migration routes. For 
instance, in 2005, Hurricane Stan destroyed the railroad from Tapachula to Arriaga, 
producing a shift of routes from the Pacific to the Lacandona jungle and the Gulf of 
Mexico.284 Coinciding with this event, in 2006, illegal immigration apprehensions 
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dropped, probably as a result of the new routes that were unknown to migration 
authorities.285 Likewise, floods have produced interruptions in migration routes because 
they block railways, destroy bridges, and make the entry through border rivers 
difficult.286 In contrast, during the dry seasons, flood plains are more passable, 
facilitating the mobilization of migrants across them and through the liquid border.287 
Illegal immigration is an adaptable process that evolves according to the 
circumstances. Not just natural disasters, but seasonal climate produces variations on 
migration routes. With this understanding the government can predict migration trends, 
implementing programs most effectively to regulate and protect migrants. 
6. Existing Routes 
The diversification of routes and points of entry respond to different strategies and 
moments of transit migration. The routes used by illegal immigrants are classified as 
maritime, air, and land. The latter, in turn, are classified in railways, walking roads, and 
highways.288 Land routes, and mainly the railways, are most commonly used to traverse 
the southern region of Mexico. Land routes in the south of the country are less diversified 
than in the north, especially because of the shape and transportation needs in that region 
of the country. As the land routes approach the central part of the country, they tend to 
diversify.289 
Illegal immigrants can cross the Mexico–Central America border using different 
points of entry and means for transportation. The first step in their journey is to traverse 
Central America and reach one of those points of entry. The selection of the crossing 
point is related to distance and ease of transit. The entry to Mexico is relatively simple 
because the border is open, and numerous access points lie close to border cities and 
roads. Once in Mexico, illegal immigrants can use four main routes to cross the south of 
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Mexico on their way to the United States. These routes are the Pacific Coast, the Central 
Region, the Jungle, and the Gulf and Caribbean (Figure 11). Mexico has not closed its 
southern border; instead, it is trying to regulate illegal immigration and illicit flows 
through the surveillance of transportation networks. Therefore, an assessment of 
migration routes is needed to understand the objectives and results of plans and programs 
implemented to control migration flows. The following sections describe the crossing 
points along the southern border of Mexico and the principal routes to transit the country. 
 
Figure 11.  Illegal Immigration Routes in Southern Mexico. 
a. Reaching the Mexican Border 
The first part of the trip for any Central American migrant to the southern border 
of Mexico is relatively easy; citizens from Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El 
Salvador are able to travel without the need of a visa between these countries under the 
Central America-4 visa program. Therefore, Central American migrants can use private 
vehicles or buses to reach the southern border of Mexico. The decision on what route to 
take depends on the selected point of entry into Mexico. For instance, Hondurans can 
take a bus through El Petén and reach the Mexican border in less than 24 hours, and 
 72
Salvadorans can use the Pan-American Highway to cross Guatemala.290 Central 
American migration accessing Mexico from Guatemala use two main corridors 
represented by the states of Tabasco and Chiapas in Mexico, and the departments of San 
Marcos, Huehuetenango, Quiche, and El Petén in Guatemalan (Figure 12).291 
Furthermore, these migrants use maritime routes departing from places like the port of 
Ocos in Guatemala.292 
Central American migrants can cross the southern border of Mexico using 
different means. They can cross by walking through the jungle and uninhabited areas, 
using small boats to cross a border river such as the Suchiate for the cost of a dollar,293 or 
employing private vehicles through dirt roads.294 The use of balsas (rafts) to cross the 
border is one of the most characteristic representations of the tacit consent of Mexican 
authorities to illegal immigration and regional movement. Once they cross the border, the 
next step is to reach a town or city where transport is more abundant. 
 
Figure 12.  Illegal Immigration Routes to Reach the Southern Border of Mexico. 
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The Mexico–Belize border is becoming increasingly important for illegal 
immigrants. While the level of mobility across this border is considerably less than on the 
Mexico–Guatemala border, in recent years it has become more dynamic in population 
mobility.295 It is because of the destruction of the railroad connecting Tapachula with 
Arriaga caused by Hurricane Stan in 2005 that produced the emergence of new migration 
routes, and the increase migration of Hondurans that found it easy to travel short 
distances through Belize. One of the most recurrent points of entry is Santa Elena, near 
the international bridge Subteniente López, which connects the city of Colozal with 
Chetumal. This passage is so common and simple that illegal immigrants do not usually 
have to use dangerous routes. They can take a taxi or walk down the bridge.296 
b. Pacific Route 
The Pacific route includes the Soconusco region cities of Tapachula, Huixtla, 
Mapastepec, Pijijiapán, Tonalá, and Arriaga, up to the city of Ixtepec, Oaxaca. This route 
starts in Tapachula. There are three legal POEs with roads heading to Tapachula that is 
considered the most important entrance through the southern border because it has 
various transport and communication routes such as the train Chiapas-Mayab connecting 
Tapachula with Ixtepec.297 Guatemalans and El Salvadorans prefer this route for its 
proximity and the transportation available. 
Immigrants use public transport as the primary means to travel from the border 
regions of Suchiate and Tuxtla Chico to Tapachula. From there, they continue on the 
Chiapas-Mayab train, particular vehicles, or public transportation. In 2005, Hurricane 
Stan destroyed the railroad tracks from Tapachula to Arriaga, suspending train operations 
for nine years, until May 2014. During this period, illegal immigrants arriving at 
Tapachula had to walk to Arriaga, a distance of 400 kilometers, for approximately two 
weeks to continue their trip north using the freight train. Another option was to alternate 
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the use of passenger buses and taxis, dismounting them before migration checkpoints, 
walking several kilometers to bypass the posts, and then boarding another taxi to continue 
north. Along the Pacific route lie several migration checkpoints. For instance, there are 
fixed posts in Huehuetán located 30 kilometers from Tapachula, in el Hueyate close to 
Huixtla, in the town of Echegaray in the municipality of Pijijiapan, in Tonalá, and in 
Arriaga.298 Furthermore, there are several mobile checkpoints along the highway 200 
and secondary roads (Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13.  Pacific Route. 
In addition to the land route, illegal immigrants can use air and maritime routes 
according to their possibilities. For instance, there are immigration controls in the 
Tapachula International Airport, but does not deter migrants with fake documents or a 
willingness to pay bribes to migration officials. Migrants using the maritime route depart 
from the port of Ocós in San Marcos, Guatemala, just a few kilometers away from the 
border. Migrants are transported by fishing boats to Puerto Madero, Barra San Simón, 
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and Barra de San José in Chiapas, where they replenish fuel and food to continue their 
journey to the coast of Oaxaca, Guerrero, and even up to Sinaloa. The Mexican Navy has 
the responsibility to patrol the territorial sea of the country; however, it does not have the 
authority to enforce migration laws.299 
c. Central Route 
The central route includes the cities of Ciudad Cuauhtémoc, Lázaro Cárdenas, La 
Trinitaria, Comitán, San Cristóbal de las Casas, and Tuxtla Gutiérrez.300 Only two legal 
POEs are part of this route (Figure 14).301 Illegal immigrants have used the Central route 
more frequently as a consequence of the disruption in the operation of the Chiapas-
Mayab train running along the Pacific route. 
 
Figure 14.  Central Route. 
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The access to Mexico via the central migration route is simple. Illegal immigrants 
can cross through blind spots, evading migration controls at the border. Several dirt roads 
for pedestrians and vehicles connect with highways 190 (Pan-American Highway). The 
most widely used means of transport is passenger buses leading to Comitán or Tuxtla 
Gutierrez. In this route, there are fixed checkpoints in Comitan, San Cristóbal, Tuxtla 
Gutiérrez, Carmen Xhan, and Amparo Agua Tinta. In sum, the access to this region is 
simple and there are plenty of means for transportation and illegal POEs; however, the 
migratory controls force illegal immigrants to follow isolated roads.302 
d. Jungle Route 
The area of influence of the jungle route includes the municipalities of Tenosique, 
Balancán, Emiliano Zapata, and Palenque in Mexico, and the department of El Petén in 
Guatemala (Figure 15). The Petén is a leading distributor of migrants to Mexico, 
especially for Hondurans, and to a lesser extent for Nicaraguans.303 This route has two 
legal POEs. A section of the Chiapas-Mayab train is used as part of this path. Migrants 
currently board the train’s northern route in Palenque, following a track along the Gulf of 
Mexico through Veracruz.304 This route became relevant with the construction of the 
highway No. 13 in Guatemala, which connects the center of El Petén department to the 
town of El Naranjo,305 and the inauguration of the highway Tenosique-El Ceibo that 
crosses the border through the legal POE Sueños de Oro, Mexico, to El Ceibo, 
Guatemala.  
Given the geographic characteristic of the Lacandona region and the Petén jungle, 
illegal immigrants and drug traffickers simultaneously use numerous illegal POEs and 
hidden pathways in the area. The only advantage of using these roads is the absence of 
migration authorities; however, the isolation, temperature, and vegetation of the region 
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and the presence of organized crime put their lives in jeopardy.306 Tenosique is a 
particularly dangerous area because of the presence of Zetas.307 
 
Figure 15.  Jungle Route. 
e. Gulf and Caribbean 
The Gulf and Caribbean route connects Belize and the northern areas of 
Guatemala with the Yucatan Peninsula, where Central American illegal immigrants, 
mostly from Honduras and El Salvador, use different means of transportation to travel 
north. According to the characteristics of the borderland, this route can be divided in two 
zones: the Hondo River basin and Campeche (Figure 16). The Hondo River basin has two 
legal border crossings. The passage through them is so common and simple that illegal 
immigrants do not usually have to venture through dangerous routes. They can take a taxi 
or walk down to the bridges carrying all sorts of goods without being disturbed.308 In 
addition to these border crossings, migrants use a sea route to transit from Corozal to 
Chetumal, landing at the same dock or at other points without being disturbed by 
migration authorities.309 
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The zone of Campeche comprises 194 kilometers of border with Guatemala. 
Curiously, no legal crossing between Mexico and Guatemala appears along this border; 
therefore, all flows occurring in this area are inevitably illegal. The principal point of 
entry to Campeche is the zone of Caobas-Arroyo Negro in the municipality of Xpujil. 
Noteworthy is the large number of communities on the border side of Campeche and in 
the roads crossing the Calakmul Biosphere Reserve, which allow the transit of migrants 
without great complications.310  
 
Figure 16.  Gulf and Caribbean Route. 
Illegal immigration routes are not a secret. Researchers, journalists, human rights 
advocates, and governmental agencies have collected information about them and the 
factors producing their adaptation. What can be extracted from this knowledge is the 
design of plans and programs to regulate the flows through these routes and the creation 
of institution with the capacity to implement them. However, the presence of the Mexican 
state in the southern region of the country is weak, and the National Migration Institute, 
as the agency responsible to enforce migration laws, lack the capacity to control all 
migration routes described. Along migration routes the government must accomplish two 
purposes; first to filter legal from illicit flows; and second, protect the rights of migrants. 
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In the next section the threats that illegal immigrants face in their transit through Mexico 
are described, because the Mexican government needs to take them into account for the 
design and implementation of plans and programs and the strengthening of institutions. 
C. THREATS FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS CROSSING MEXICO 
During an interview on July 1, 2010, Arizona Governor Janice K. Brewer said, 
“We cannot afford all this illegal immigration and everything that comes with it, 
everything from the crime and to the drugs and the kidnappings and the extortion and the 
beheadings and the fact that people cannot feel safe in their community. It is wrong!”311 
Her argument is an example of disseminated ideas about the implicit relationship between 
security and illegal immigration. To affirm that all illegal immigrants are a threat to the 
state is out of place.  It is a powerful political tool, however, to strengthen border controls 
and criminalize migration for the sake of national security, sovereignty, and identity.312 
States have the prerogative to secure their borders; likewise, they have an obligation to 
protect the human rights of any person in their territory. If controlling the border puts 
illegal immigrants in the hands of organized crime and corrupt officials, then government 
action loses legitimacy. Hence, the challenge for the Mexican government is to secure the 
southern border of the country and to regulate migration while guaranteeing the human 
rights and integrity of migrants.313 
Scholars, journalists,314 human rights advocates,315 and the media have 
condemned the precarious conditions and vulnerability of illegal immigrants in transit 
through Mexico.316 They have attracted the attention of civil society and the international 
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community about an issue the Mexican government has barely recognized.317 According 
to several reports, more than 50 percent of illegal immigrants are robbed, 33 percent are 
extorted,318 and 80 percent of Central American migrant women are sexually assaulted. 
A disturbing statistic is that at least 1,600 migrants are kidnapped per month in 
Mexico.319 In sum, migrants are victims of at least one of the following abuses: theft, 
physical violence, rape, kidnap, torture, amputation, extortion, exploitation, 
imprisonment, and murder.320  
Illegal immigrants make stops along the railroad to rest, taking advantage of 
migration shelters that offer them essential services and protection. However, organized 
crime has infiltrated these places to gather information for possible victims of 
exploitation, extortion, or kidnapping.321 Furthermore, intelligence reports indicate that 
organized crime is pressuring shelters to deliver a fixed number of migrants for extortion 
and exploitation each week. The use of coyotes is a critical factor for illegal immigrants 
to complete their journey. Restrictive border controls have increased the number of 
professional smugglers and the necessity to use them.322 According to different statistics, 
six out of ten migrants use such services to enter the United States, and 43 percent use 
them to traverse Mexico.323 Some experts agree that the smuggling of illegal immigrants 
has become the most lucrative illegal activity in Mexico after drug trafficking.324 Coyotes 
charge thousands of dollars to transport a migrant from Central America to the United 
States, although the cash does not ensure a safe passage through Mexico. The Zetas 
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Cartel and the Maras have monopolized the smuggling of Maras, and if coyotes do not 
pay a fee for each migrant they are hauling, organized crime takes them off and punishes 
the coyote. Therefore, coyotes are also trying to survive the onslaught of organized crime 
and to evade apprehension, and they will do whatever is needed to achieve it. They 
abandon migrants in inhospitable places after being paid, expose them to ambushes 
where they are kidnapped, or simply receive payment and never show up.325 
The most brutal scenario is the mass kidnapping of illegal immigrants along the 
Zetas territory. The modus operandi is quite simple. First, train drivers, sometimes in 
complicity with criminals, stop the train where heavily armed Zeta members are waiting. 
Then, they take migrants to safe houses—where they are tortured and abused—to obtain 
information on their families in the United States to ask for a ransom, which varies 
between $1,500 and $5,000. 326 Some estimates indicate that the kidnapping of illegal 
immigrants produces $40 million in profits annually.327 The purpose of these abductions 
is mainly to extort the migrants’ families in the United States and their countries of 
origin, but also to recruit them as assassins or workers for safe houses, for prostitution, 
and for trafficking in organs.328 Raúl Bringas Nostti explains that the kidnapping of 
foreigners, which represents less than 1 percent of the total population of Mexico, is 70 
percent higher than toward Mexican citizens, demonstrating the vulnerability of migrants 
to this type of crime.329 This also proves the incapacity of the government to provide 
security to migrants. 
Mass kidnappings not only happen on the train. In 2008, for example, armed 
groups entered the immigration checkpoint of San Pedro Tapanatepec, Oaxaca, and 
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extracted all women and minors migrants.330 From 2008 to 2010, at least three cases of 
organized crime incursions to kidnap migrants were documented in migration stations.331 
Likewise, in June 2008, an armed group intercepted an immigration convoy along the 
Ocosingo-Palenque highway with 36 illegal immigrants from Cuba, Guatemala, and El 
Salvador, and kidnapped them.332 The abduction and murder of 72 Central American 
illegal immigrants in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, in 2010 marked the breaking point for 
Mexico to change migration policies.333 According to the National Commission of 
Human Rights (CNDH), migration authorities also colluded with organized crime to 
abduct migrants.334  
The only government agencies authorized to enforce migration laws are the 
National Migration Institute and the Federal Police; however, armed forces, local and 
state police, and even private security from the railroad companies participate in the 
apprehension of illegal immigrants. This represents fertile land for corruption and human 
rights abuses. Corruption of migration officials primarily consists of bribes to grant safe 
passage of illegal immigrants through checkpoints.335 Furthermore, some migration 
authorities charged thousands of dollars to allow the passage of traffickers of drugs, 
weapons, humans, exotic animals, or archeological artifacts.336 According to a report 
presented by the Documentation Network of Migrant Advocacy Organizations (Red de 
Documentación de las Organizaciones Defensoras de Migrantes), migration officials 
commit bribery against 71 percent of illegal immigrants and robbery against 29 percent. 
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Likewise, the Federal Police commit robbery against 53 percent of migrants, abuse of 
authority against 19 percent, and physical violence against 2 percent.337 
Corruption is not exclusive to Mexican migration authorities. In Guatemala, a 
network of widespread corruption in all migration delegations produces profits from 
illegal immigrants and temporary workers attempting to enter Mexico.338 Furthermore, 
Guatemalan migration officials in charge of receiving the deportees from Mexico, and 
sending non-Guatemalan citizens to their countries, ask for bribes to register those 
migrants as Guatemalans, which allows them to restart their journey north from that 
country.339 The National Civil Police has also been involved in cases of abuses and 
briberies against migrants.340 Along the U.S.–Mexico border, U.S. migration authorities 
are not exempted from corruption. Between 2005 and 2012, at least 125 Customs and 
Border Patrol agents were convicted for smuggling illegal immigrants and for 
corruption.341 Likewise, at least eight National Guard members have been arrested for the 
same charges.342 
Central American illegal immigrants have to travel more than 3,000 kilometers 
from their home countries to the U.S.–Mexico border. They face a complicated situation 
in their transit because of organized crime assaults, murder, exploitation, and 
kidnapping.343 Furthermore, some migration and security officials in Mexico, Guatemala, 
and the United States have been implicated in cases of corruption and abuses against 
                                                 
337 Red de Documentación de las Organizaciones Defensoras de Migrantes, Informe Sobre las 
Violaciones a Derechos Humanos y Delitos Cometidos a Transmigrantes Centroamericanos, 55. Accessed 
October 12, 2014. http://www.flacsi.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Trilog%C3%ADa2.-Delitos-y-
violaciones.pdf. 
338 García and Tarrío, “Tensiones entre los Derechos Humanos, Ley y Justicia,” 137. 
339 Grayson, “Mexico’s Forgotten Southern Border.” 
340 Ibid., Grayson, “Mexico’s Forgotten Southern Border.” 
341 Papademetriou, Meissner, and Sohnen, “Migration and Human Capital,” 19. 
342 “Trafica con migrantes la Guardia Nacional,” El Universal, last updated September 20, 2014, 
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2014/trafica-con-migrantes-la-guardia-nacional-
1039581.html. 
343 Steven Dudley, “Transnational Crime in Mexico and Central America: Its Evolution and Role in 
International Migration,” in International Migration (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012): 1. 
 84
migrants.344 It leaves illegal immigrants with the paradigm of choosing the lesser evil 
between corrupt officials or criminals—and sometimes they are one and the same. Then, 
the vertical border of Mexico has become an area where surveillance, violence, 
corruption, and hope coexist. What is contradictory is that most of the communities on 
both sides of the Mexico–Guatemala border have homicide rates below the national 
average,345 indicating that the violence is on the migration routes and not on the border 
itself. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The southern border of Mexico is a complex system due to the informal relations 
between communities on both sides of the border, its geopolitical conditions, and the 
actors participating on its conceptualization. Therefore, border controls to regulate illegal 
immigration need to face that complexity. First and foremost, Mexico and Guatemala 
established the border to delineate each country, but shared culture and economic 
interdependence made it easy to ignore that fact. Informal movement of people and goods 
across the borderland give social stability and dynamism to the economy of the region. 
The southern states of the country have been relegated by the centralism of the 
government, and closing the border is detrimental for the economic and social stability of 
the region. This is one of the reasons for the implementation of a vertical border for the 
regulation of migration, with feeble controls along the border, and tighter ones along 
transit routes. Furthermore, the number of legal POEs, infrastructure, and processes to 
allow and regulate border flows is insufficient. It is easier for migrants to pay one dollar 
to cross the border and save time and bureaucratic complications.  
The geographic features of the border facilitate illicit flows through the jungle, 
mountain roads, and rivers. In contrast, these characteristics complicate its control. 
Excluding the legal POEs, armed forces are the only federal agencies with a presence 
along the border, although they do not have the attribution, training, and resources to 
enforce migration laws. To lessen the adversity implicit in the geography of the border, 
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the Mexican government has oriented its efforts to more manageable areas like the 
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, a zone in which all migration routes converge. However, the 
variety of transport methods, the weak presence of the state, and the association of illegal 
immigrants with other actors deteriorate the enforcement along this belt of control. 
The self-reinforcing cycle of measures and countermeasures between the 
government, organized crime, and illegal immigration complicate the control of the 
border even more. Security and migration agencies have identified the principal 
migration routes, and in consequence, have established fixed and mobile checkpoints and 
detention centers. The setup of these controls, however, is not enough to deter migrants. 
In contrast, illegal immigrants change routes and hire the service of professional 
smugglers according to various circumstances and their resources. Usually, they decide to 
risk themselves, following inhospitable routes that take them to the hands of criminals. 
Zetas, Maras, local gangs, and coyotes abuse the necessity and illegality of migrants. 
They steal, extort, rape, traffic, and murder migrants with the complicity of corrupt 
officials and the indifference of society. The form in which different Mexican 
administrations have responded to the adaptation of illegal immigrants and the violation 
of organized crime is described in the following chapter. 
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IV. MIGRATION POLICIES AND GAPS 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the gaps between the plans and programs 
implemented during the last three administrations in Mexico—to regulate illegal 
immigration on the southern border of the country—and their outcome. Previous chapters 
described the complexities of Mexico as a transit country, the origin and patterns of 
Central American illegal immigration, and the challenge to control the border. Also 
explained were the weak presence of the state, corruption, the lack of protection of illegal 
immigrants, and the implementation of a vertical border. However, each administration 
has faced particular contexts at the domestic and international levels, and in consequence, 
they have defined different priorities and mechanisms to regulate illegal immigration. 
The assessment of those mechanisms helps to identify three gaps. The first is a discursive 
gap consisting of the difference between political discourse and the policies and laws 
enacted. Second is the operational gap that differentiates between plans and programs and 
their implementation. Finally, the efficiency gap describes the results obtained through 
the implementation of specific measures to control illegal immigration.  
Illegal immigration and borders are per se complex systems, and long-term 
planning to solve transnational problems is difficult; therefore, the approach to analyze 
specific plans and programs to determine their success in regulating migration and 
controlling the border is limited. Illegal immigrants are, as Robert Geyer and Samir 
Rihani explain, “complex persons in a society in which brutal, and often well-intentioned, 
internal or external decision makers were attempting to impose the impossible: a rigid 
orderly outcome on an inherently complex adaptive situation.” 346 Illegal immigration is 
not orderly and predictable, and borders evolve according to social, political, economic, 
and security factors; therefore, the application of reductionist models and causal relations 
to regulate illegal immigration on the border is destined to fail. Instead, states require the 
determination of achievable objectives, and the use of soft methodologies that can be 
continuously evaluated and adapted. Another factor that adds complexity is the 
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interpretation of illegal immigration as a problem, and in what way it is a problem. For 
some states and societies, it can be seen as a threat, and for others, as a solution to social 
and economic concerns. The assessment of three administrations to identify different 
gaps reduces that limitation. 
There are different reports from the Mexican government, international 
organizations, and non-state actors concluding that the regulation of illegal immigration 
and the control of the southern border of Mexico are badly broken. Likewise, they 
identify that closing the border through the use of walls, the criminalization of illegal 
immigrants, and militarization are not the solution because of the weak presence of the 
state, low professionalization of migration and security agencies, poor coordination, and 
corruption.347 For instance, Natalia Armijo Canto argues that the actions implemented in 
Mexico to control the southern border of the country have not been reflected in the field 
because the capabilities and objectives of the different sectors and levels of government 
have not been harmonized.348 Therefore, the assessment presented in this chapter is not 
oriented to identify the hardness of the border; instead, it is oriented to the identification 
of the coherence between objectives, the implementation of programs, and the results 
obtained. It means that the management of illegal immigration on the southern border of 
Mexico is associated with activities of planning, organization, coordination, and control 
to achieve consistency, capacity, and continuity.349 
The transition of political parties in power in 2000, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
war against drugs declared in 2006, international economic crises, the approval of the 
Mexican immigration reform in 2011,350 resources form the Merida Initiative,351 and the 
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increment of the defense budget,352 have changed the narrative of illegal immigration 
from and through Mexico. Furthermore, Mexico faces the dilemma to resist international 
pressures from the United States to control its southern border and stop illegal 
immigration,353 and from Central American countries to protect their citizens in transit 
through Mexico, while designing migration laws according to national interests and the 
exigencies of civil society.354 Internal political preferences are another important factor to 
define migration policies in Mexico. For instance, Ernesto Zedillo promoted a vision of 
Mexico as a country without borders. Vicente Fox fostered restrictive policies to control 
the southern border of the country and signed the Mexico-U.S. Border Partnership Action 
Plan in 2002,355 hoping to negotiate an immigration reform with the United States, but 
his efforts failed. Felipe Calderón removed migration from the bilateral agenda with the 
United States.356 He increased considerably the defense budget,357 incorporated the 
armed forces to fight organized crime throughout the country, and continued with the 
gradual militarization of the border to prevent drug trafficking.358 Peña-Nieto has opted 
for a regional and integral approach for the regularization of transit migration and non-
interference in the U.S. immigration reform. 
Mexico has made attempts to improve the security and management of the border 
with operations like “Sellamiento” in 1998,359 “Plan Sur” in 2001,360 and the “Plan de 
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Reordenamiento de la Frontera Sur” in 2008,361 but with questionable results. In April 
2014, the Program for National Security 2014–2018, and the Regional Program for the 
Development of the South-Southeast 2014–2018 were promulgated in the Official 
Journal of the Federation (DOF), with the purpose to guide the implementation of the 
National Development Plan (PND) 2013–2018. These documents, however, do not 
present clear strategies to manage the southern border of the country. Furthermore, the 
lines of actions described emphasize the development of infrastructure, the government’s 
intelligence apparatus, and the regional economy, but without a risk analysis, lack of the 
specificity about tasks, assignment of responsibilities, coordination between objectives, 
and the model of border to be implemented.  
In Mexico, the legal framework for the regulation of immigration is composed of 
the following instruments: the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (1917), 
the Migration Law (2011) and its Regulation (2012), the Nationality Act (1998) and its 
Regulation (2009), and the General Population Law (1974) and its Regulation (2000). 
Laura V. González-Murphy and Rey Koslowski analyze the evolution of immigration 
laws in Mexico including an examination of amendments and proposals for an 
immigration reform. They explain the national and international factors that have 
motivated such reforms; these factors include the complex condition of Mexico as a 
“country of emigration, immigration, refuge, transit, and return migration,”362 the 
necessity to enhance the control and security of cross-border flows, to limit the practice 
of corruption of immigration officials, to protect human rights and integrity of illegal 
immigrants, external political pressure, and international treaty obligations. Although 
policies and regulations may be in place, they are often ignored.363 
This chapter is organized in specific sections for each of the administrations 
included in the assessment. The first section covers the Vicente Fox government from 
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2000 to 2006. The next section includes the Felipe Calderón administration from 2007 to 
2012. Finally, the current Enrique Peña-Nieto government is presented. In each section, 
the same methodology is used, including the description of the context and priorities 
defined by each administration; then, the three gaps are identified through the analysis of 
plans, programs, reforms, public statements, and resources assigned. Furthermore, 
information presented in previous chapters is used to emphasis the results obtained by 
each administration. Finally, conclusions are presented. 
A. THE REGULATION OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE VICENTE 
FOX ADMINISTRATION 
Migration policies in Mexico, characterized by a low-profile diplomatic position, 
changed dramatically in year 2000 with the culmination of the transition to democracy in 
the country. Vicente Fox, as the first president of an opposition party and native of one of 
the traditional Mexican emigration states (Guanajuato), placed for the first time in the 
bilateral agenda with the United States the need for a comprehensive migration reform. 
This proposal included the regularization of undocumented Mexicans residing in that 
country, temporary-worker programs, the expansion of visa quotas for Mexicans, a joint 
effort for controlling the border, and the economic fostering of migrant expulsion 
regions.364 In December 2000, the U.S. embassy warned Fox that there was no 
opportunity for the migration reform if Mexico did not stop the flow of Central American 
illegal immigrants heading to the United States.365 In consequence, Mexico promised to 
seal its southern border, offering the restriction to Central American transit illegal 
immigration as a bargain coin.366 
In early 2001, Presidents Fox and Bush started high-level discussions to reach a 
comprehensive migration reform, and the expectation were high until the 9/11 terrorists 
attacks. In consequence, the Mexico–United States migration relationship shifted from 
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integration to the securitization of migration and the strengthening of border controls, 
subordinating immigration issues to homeland security and anti-terrorist operations.367 
During the Summit of the Americas in 2001, President Bush made reference to the Third 
Border Initiatives (TBI), recognizing the relevance of Central America and the southern 
border of Mexico for the security of the United States.368 In its quest to reach regional 
integration with North America, Mexico faced the dilemma to harden migration controls 
on its southern border or to strengthen the historical relations of the southern states of the 
country with Central American countries. 
The Fox administration tried to achieve a balance between its compromise for 
regional security with the United States, and the economic relations with Central 
America. Given the need of cross-border trade, and the informal crossing of Guatemalan 
laborers and border residents to compensate for the lack of socioeconomic development 
and the weak presence of the state in the region,369 Mexico did not attempted to enforce 
the physical southern border of the country.370 Instead, this administration used a vertical 
border approach with belts of control and mobile checkpoints to enforce migration 
controls and simultaneously to give some space for informal border relations. 
Furthermore, some agreements were signed with Central American countries to share the 
responsibility to regulate illegal immigrations.371 Despite the efforts of the Fox 
administration to maintain a good image of Mexico with Central America, the country 
was perceived as an ally of the United States and as a checkpoint country (país retén).372 
1. Discursive Gap 
The first gap identifies the distance between the political discourse of the Fox 
administration and its translation into specific plans, programs, and reforms. The 
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migration perspective of that administration is evident in public statements and the 
National Development Plan 2001–2006 that are included in the analysis.  
President Fox declared during his election campaign that he would assume a more 
proactive defense of the rights of Mexican migrants residing in the United States. 
Likewise, he stated that his administration would not allow further abuses against Central 
American immigrants in the country, for which he would appoint a czar for the southern 
border and create the Commission for the Protection of Migrants in the Office of the 
Presidency under the direct coordination of the National Security Council.373 As a result 
of the first high-level talks between Mexican and U.S. authorities, Secretary of the 
Interior Santiago Creel declared that, in exchange for a U.S. migration reform in favor of 
Mexicans, the Fox administration was willing and prepared to strengthen its efforts to 
stop illegal immigrants using Mexico as a platform to reach the United States. He 
recognized that, in previous administrations, few actions were taken to curb the 
smuggling of people and drugs on the southern border, and that the control of the border 
had failed because there was no plan. He announced the channeling of resources to 
modernize and increase border infrastructure and checkpoints and the participation of the 
armed forces and the federal police in critical locations such as the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec. Finally, Creel explained that the National Migration Institute would be 
reorganized to increase its professionalism and to eradicate corruption.374 
To reduce the controversy over the Mexican migration policy, which consisted of 
the support of Mexican migrants while implementing restrictive practices against Central 
American migrants—similar to those used by the United States, of which Mexico 
complained—Commissioner of the National Migration Institute Felipe Preciado declared 
that Mexico would not do the dirty work of the United States. Instead, he argued that the 
goal of that policy was to fight the illicit trafficking of drugs, people, and weapons. 
Another objective was to repatriate Central American illegal immigrants in the south of 
Mexico to reduce their risks of being harmed while in their transit through Mexico. 
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Preciado stated that the Isthmus of Tehuantepec would be used to maximize the efforts, 
and that coordination between security agencies in the region would be improved.375 
In the National Development Plan 2001–2006, the Fox administration established 
as a priority the need to control the growing illegal trafficking of drugs, people, and 
weapons on the southern border of Mexico. It emphasized the need to participate in 
international forums and negotiations to address the structural roots of migration, its 
manifestations and consequences, and it declared illegal immigration as a shared 
responsibility. This plan also recognized that economic development and integration 
between the southern region of the country and Central America could help to combat 
illegal activities in the region. Furthermore, it recognized that Central American illegal 
immigrants were subject to abuses, and the National Migration Institute lacked the 
personal and infrastructure at border points.376 
The Mexican migration policy promoted by the Fox administration focused 
primarily on the following points: Facilitate the regulation of undocumented workers 
whose temporary and definitive destination is the southern states of Mexico, protect the 
rights of illegal migrants in transit, foster the security of the region, and update the 
management of migration flows. To implement this migration policy, the Fox 
administration promoted various plans and programs on the southern border of the 
country, of which the most important were the following: 
 The Southern Plan (Plan Sur), in force between 2001 and 2003.377 
 Regularization of migrants and temporary-worker programs.378  
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 The Proposal of Integral Migration Policy for the Southern Border of 
Mexico.379 
 Anti-Maras police operations such as Operation Acero.380 
The main migration regulation in Mexico during the Fox administration was the 
1976 General Population Law. This instrument specified that illegal immigration was a 
crime punished by jail and fines. Furthermore, it declared that the enforcement of 
migration laws was an exclusive responsibility of the National Migration Institute with 
support of the Federal Police. This law contained restrictions that made the obtainment of 
a permanent work visa in Mexico even harder than getting a green card in the United 
States.381 However, Central Americans could request a visa to stay in the country for up 
to thirty days. These restrictions made the General Population Law an absolute 
instrument for the effective and humanitarian regulation of illegal immigration.382 During 
the Fox administration, no reforms were enacted to this law. 
International agreements related to the regulation of illegal immigration 
complemented domestic instruments. For instance, in June 2001, President Fox launched 
the Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP) to create a development corridor from the Mexican state 
of Puebla to Panama that would allow the economic growth and integration of the region, 
and the reduction of incentives to migrate.383 Likewise, Mexico signed with Central 
American governments the Agreement for the Dignified, Orderly, and Secure 
Repatriation of Migrants (2002, updated in 2004 and 2005).384 In 2002, the Group on 
Temporary Guatemalan Migrant Workers was created to regulate and support temporary 
agricultural workers laboring in the southern region of Mexico.385 With the purpose to 
improve the security and prevent illicit activities on the border, Mexico, Guatemala, and 
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Belize created the High-Level Group on Border Security (GANSEF) in 2002.386 The 
Program for the Sustainable Development of Border Communities (PRODESFRO) 
between Mexico and Guatemala proposed the improvement of the control and 
documentation of migration flows, promoted human rights of migrants, and fostered the 
economic development of the border communities.387 Other instruments included the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Human Rights and the Memorandum of 
Understanding for the Protection of Women and Minors Victims of Trafficking and 
Exploitation in the Mexico–Guatemala Border.388 Moreover, in 2002, Mexico and the 
United States signed the Smart Border Agreement to strengthen the control of Mexico’s 
southern border and to share information.389 
In conclusion, the Fox administration was coherent between the political 
discourse and the definition of programs; therefore, the discursive gap was almost non-
existent. The government started with the purpose of protecting the rights of Mexican 
migrants in the United States and to urge agreements with the United States for an 
integral migration reform. To achieve that purpose, Mexico was willing to strengthen its 
southern border to stop illegal immigration from Central America to the United States as 
a bargaining coin. In addition, this administration was aware of conditions in the region 
and the necessity to allow informal flows of people and goods in the borderland to 
alleviate the poor social and economic situation. In consequence, Fox responded with 
domestic plans and programs as well as international agreements to balance its 
compromises with the United States, Central America, and the southern states of the 
country. The Southern Plan and the militarization of the border demonstrated the 
willingness of the Mexican government to stop Central American illegal immigration in 
transit to the United States, but maintained flexibility for informality in the region. 
Furthermore, programs like the Puebla-Panama Project reflected the intention of the 
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Mexican government to reduce the economic factors of illegal immigration in Central 
America and foster international cooperation. 
The government recognized the vulnerability of Central American illegal 
immigrants and the abuses and extortions they suffered in the hands of organized crime 
and state officials. To solve this problem, the Fox administrations proposed the 
reorganization of the National Migration Institute for training and professionalization in 
human rights. The government identified as an effective strategy the need to protect the 
integrity of illegal immigrants during their detention in the southern region of the 
country. It would prevent abuses in their transit through Mexico. Furthermore, the 
government signed agreements to repatriate Central American migrants from Tapachula 
to Guatemala. 
The Fox administration was capable of translating political discourse of plans and 
programs to regulate illegal immigration and control the border. This does not mean, 
however, that these instruments were developed from a risk assessment, with a systemic 
approach, and through a planning process that identified the required resources, points of 
intervention, the adjustment of migration, unintended consequences, and evaluation 
processes. Furthermore, the efforts of the government were oriented to the detention and 
repatriation of illegal immigrants, and not to the regulation of migration flows, since the 
migration laws were not suited for the circumstances. 
2. Operational Gap 
The second gap identifies the distance between the enactment of plans and 
programs for the regulation of illegal immigration and their implementation. Three 
factors are important for the execution of those plans and programs. First, the definition 
of objectives and the assignment of responsibilities have to be clearly stated. Second, the 
assignment of resources has to correspond to the objectives and the context of the 
situation. And third, instruments and procedures are required for the coordination of the 
agencies involved in the control of the border. To determine the characteristics of this 
gap, the Southern Plan, the Proposal of Integral Migration Policy for the Southern Border 
of Mexico, and the Plan Puebla-Panama are used. 
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The objectives of the Southern Plan were to strengthen inspection activities, fight 
the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and persons, regulate illegal migrants, foster 
coordination among migration and security agencies, optimize resources available, and 
increase the number of illegal immigrant detentions.390 To achieve these objectives, the 
Southern Plan considered as strategies an effective interagency coordination between the 
Secretary of the Interior (SEGOB), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SRE), the Attorney 
General (PGR), the Secretary of Public Security (SSP), the armed forces, and the local 
governments of Chiapas, Tabasco, Yucatán, Veracruz, and Oaxaca. Furthermore, it 
included the implementation of belts of control in the southern region of the country, 
particularly in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and main migration routes, the strengthening 
of intelligence operations and information sharing, and the execution of joint operations 
under the coordination of the National Immigration Institute.391 Other considerations 
were the improvement of Beta groups in the region, the construction of migration 
detention centers, and a program for the expedited repatriation of Central American 
illegal immigrants.392 In addition, the Southern Plan considered the reorganization of the 
National Migration Institute to foster its professionalization and the eradication of 
corruption.393  
The Southern Plan stated objectives, strategies, and programs, however, they were 
broadly defined, and this plan did not designate specific responsibilities, resources, 
processes for coordination, and metrics for evaluation. The National Migration Institute’s 
role was to coordinate efforts, but it lacked the infrastructure, resources and processes to 
carry out that responsibility. Each agency participating in the implementation of the plan 
had its own sectorial program and legal framework from which to support its actions. For 
instance, the responsibility to enforce migration legislation belonged to the National 
Migration Institute; customs was the responsibility of the Secretariat of Finance and 
Public Credit, and the federal and state police were responsible for security as in any 
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other region of the country. Likewise, the armed forces supported the Attorney General to 
prevent the traffic of drugs and weapons. Therefore, there was no agency responsible for 
the control of the border, and each one assumed its mission, established checkpoints, and 
managed their resources individually. Since the plan mixed security and illegal 
immigration issues, the agencies operating on the border executed activities for which 
they did not have the authority, resources, and training; furthermore, they acted with an 
abundance of discretion.  
For the implementation of the Southern Plan, the Fox administration designated 
several financial resources, and expanded the infrastructure for the control of the southern 
border. For instance, the plan had an initial budget of $11 million to improve migration 
checkpoints and provide Beta Groups with more personnel and equipment. In addition, 
other resources were assigned for the repatriation of illegal immigrants.394 The 
government established four new legal POEs along the border to facilitate the legal 
transit of people and goods,395 built a shelter for unaccompanied migrant children, and 
established a new detention center in Tapachula with capacity for 15,000 detainees.396 
There is no information available with more detail about the assignment of resources for 
the implementation of the southern plan, and it is coherent with the lack of specificity for 
the designation of responsibilities. For instance, in the Expenditure Budget of the 
Federation for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, approximately $80 million were designated for 
the development of the southern region of the country and the Puebla-Panama Plan, but 
there is no information about its distribution. Likewise, $380 million were designated for 
the Secretary of the Interior, of which the National Migration Institute is part, both there 
is no information about the financial resources assigned to the Southern Plan. 
During the Fox administration, the National Migration Institute had 3,800 
employees of whom 125 migration agents were assigned to the southern region of the 
country. Therefore, the first problem was the weak presence of the agency responsible for 
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enforcing migration laws on the border. In addition, the level of corruption was 
considerable. For instance, forty-two current or former agents were arrested for their 
involvement in human smuggling networks.397 Magdalena Carral Cuevas, Commissioner 
of the National Migration Institute since mid-2002, made efforts for the 
professionalization of the agency and for its modernization. During her administration 
databases were installed in all the agency’s state offices and the Advanced Passenger 
Information System was developed. To reduce corruption, Carral introduced drug test for 
agents, the Center for Research and National Security screened them, increased the 
requirements of education to enter the agency, and raised their salary.398 Likewise, more 
personnel were added to the Beta Groups.399 However, migration commissioners were 
appointed and replaced for political reasons, producing discontinuity of programs and the 
reorganization of the National Migration Institute. Commissioner Preciado had no 
previous experience in migration matters, and even with his efforts to improve the 
institute, he stayed in office less than two years. Likewise, Carral had no experience in 
migration, border, or security issues. She lasted less than three years in office, and the 
programs for the reorganization of the institute were curtailed with her replacement.400 
The Southern Plan considered as a strategy interagency coordination, but did not 
specify the instruments and processes to achieve that control. The only statement in this 
plan was the designation of the National Migration Institute for its coordination. 
Moreover, since there was no specific budget for its implementation, and each agency 
used their resources according to their priorities, it was difficult to achieve a complete 
integration. Each agency installed checkpoints independently, which explains why, in the 
principal highways of the southern region, it was possible to find several of them, 
duplicating efforts and wasting resources. 
To replace the Southern Plan, the National Migration Institute developed, in 2005, 
the Proposal of Integral Migration Policy for the Southern Border of Mexico as a result of 
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three forums called “Toward a Comprehensive Immigration Policy in the Southern 
Border of Mexico” held in Tapachula, Chiapas. Although it was not formalized, this 
proposal became a substantive element of Mexico’s migration policy.401 The proposal 
identified four strategies: first, the facilitation of legal migration flows to the southern 
states of the country; second, protection of the rights of illegal immigrants; third, 
fostering of the security of the border; fourth, actualization of the migration laws and 
processes for the management of migration. Specifically, it included temporary-worker 
programs, the implementation of repatriation programs, cooperation networks with non-
state actors and the civil society, and the reinforcement of border controls and actions 
against human trafficking. Furthermore, it proposed the strengthening of the National 
Migration Institute in issues related to human rights, the eradication of corruption, the 
modernization of information systems for the management of migration, and processes 
for the evaluation of programs and projects related to migration.402 
The proposal delineated strategies and objectives for the regulation of migration 
and the control of the border. They were oriented to the National Migration Institute 
through the awareness on human rights, legal, and logistical processes regarding illegal 
immigrants; however, these strategies were not specific, provision on security issues were 
not considered, and responsibilities to other agencies related to migration and border 
security were excluded. There is no possible way to determine why this proposal was not 
implemented, but it set the precedent for future migration reforms and processes. 
In June 2001, the Fox administration launched the Puebla-Panama Plan.403 Its 
purpose was to create a corridor of development with the construction of highways, 
airports, ports, energy production, telecommunications, and infrastructure required for the 
development of the region.404 The objectives of the plan were the raising of the level of 
human and social development of the region, the modernization of institutions, the 
achievement of structural changes within the economy, the promotion of productive 
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investments to generate jobs, and to promote the integration of the southern region of 
Mexico with Central America.405 This plan did not serve as a catalyst to strengthen the 
development of the region for several reasons, including insufficient funding, lack of 
support and even outright opposition from some sectors of civil society, distrust between 
Mexico and Central American governments, regional disputes for resources, and 
discontinuity in the leadership of the plan.406 From the ambitious projects proposed, 
including a refinery, the only accomplishments were the establishment of an electricity 
connection between Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize, and the construction of a highway 
between Honduras and Guatemala.407 
3. Efficiency Gap 
This gap is related to the effectiveness of the plans and programs to regulate 
illegal immigration on the southern border of Mexico. Observations from previous gaps 
illustrate that objectives, strategies, and responsibilities were not clearly stated, and that 
there was a lack of resources, organization, and coordination to apply effectively the 
plans and programs proposed. However, an analysis of their application is relevant to 
determine deficiencies that prevented their proper operation and the achievement of 
objectives. 
The major problem in determining the effectiveness of plans and programs during 
the Fox administration is that the migration policy, objectives, and evaluation processes 
were not specific, and security issues eclipsed migration concerns. Armijo-Canto explains 
that the immigration controls implemented during this administration were a chip in the 
bargaining game to obtain a U.S. migration reform for the benefit of Mexicans.408 
Therefore, the purpose was control and restriction of transit illegal immigration, and not 
its prevention and regulation.409 It was clear that the Mexican government bent to the 
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securitization of migration and the integration of the country with North America with 
actions like the incorporation of the National Migration Institute to National Security 
Council in 2005.410 This vision was highly criticized by domestic and international 
actors,411 and it was not clear enough to build state capacity and coordination for the 
regulation of migration and the control of the border.412 
The Fox administration was not capable of defining what the country wanted and 
needed in terms of migration dynamics. The strengthening of the National Migration 
Institute, operations to secure the border, the enactment of temporary-worker and 
regularization programs, and the establishment of international agreements were 
indications of a migration policy toward the southern border of the country, but these 
efforts were not consolidated.413 Economic, social, political, and security factors were not 
integrated into a formal migration policy; instead, the tolerance of the Fox administration 
for informal flows of people and goods through the border gave too much discretion for 
the commitment of abuses against illegal immigrants.414 
The Southern Plan lacked the integrality, resources, and transversal coordination 
among agencies and non-state actors required to attend to migration as a social, 
economic, political, and security phenomena. Its planning and implementation ignored 
social relations between border communities and the incentives for Central Americans to 
reach the United States for family reunification. The temporary-worker and regularization 
programs oriented to integrate migrants to economic activities in the southern states of 
the country did not have the proper publicity and acceptance.415 The legal framework to 
give certainty to illegal immigrants and agencies was obsolete and there were no attempts 
for its reform during the Fox administration.416 Lack of budgetary, human, and 
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infrastructure resources of the agencies involved in the application of plans and 
programs, and the intensification of illegal immigration flows complicated the regulation 
of migration and the control of the southern border.417 The geographic characteristics of 
the border, and the diversity of transportation complicated the implementation of 
controls. Furthermore, Mexico, as a primary emigration country, did not have the 
experience and resources to regulate transit migration.418  
As described in Chapter II, the number of detentions from 2001 to 2006 raised to 
an average of 184,269 persons per year. In contrast, between 1994 and 2000, this average 
was 65,508 detentions.419 As explained before, detentions cannot be interpreted as a 
success of migration plans and programs because Central American illegal immigrants 
were deported from Tapachula to Guatemala, and then started their migration north again. 
Therefore, migrants are detained several times, adding to the statistics. Likewise, a 
reduction of detentions does not necessarily mean that a specific strategy is working to 
deter illegal immigrants; instead, it could indicate that they adapted routes and strategies 
to evade migration controls. Furthermore, a lack of evaluation parameters makes it 
difficult to determination the degree of compliance of plans and programs.420 
The securitization of migration and the militarization of the border under the Fox 
administration produced more detentions, but they also produced human rights 
violations,421 corruption, and dislocation with Central America.422 Restrictive measures 
pushed illegal immigrants to inhospitable routes and to resort more frequently to using 
professional smuggling networks, thus increasing the physical and economic 
vulnerability of migrants, and strengthening illicit activities.423 The Southern Plan 
defined the Isthmus of Tehuantepec as the perfect point of intervention because the flows 
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of migrants were forced to cross that demarcation; however, organized crime also 
identified and exploited the same area to offer their services, and to exploit and assault 
illegal immigrants. Likewise, illegal immigrants used social networks, the service of 
smugglers, corrupt officials, and unsupervised routes to continue their migration north 
because the incentives to leave their country and reach the United States were not 
reduced. Finally, civil society did not ask for a closed border and the detention of illegal 
immigrants.424 An effective application of the top-down migration policy of restriction 
offered few political gains. Also, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a U.S. migration policy 
to benefit Mexicans was out of negotiations and the incentives of the government to 
regulate illegal immigration were even less. 
B. THE REGULATION OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE FELIPE 
CALDERÓN ADMINISTRATION 
Felipe Calderón became President of Mexico under different circumstances than 
those of Vicente Fox. The 2006 election was the most competitive in Mexican history, 
with a difference of 0.58 percent between the National Action Party and the Democratic 
Revolution Party.425 The post electoral conflict set by the opposition threatened the 
stability and the legitimacy of the new government. Different authors explain that, as a 
strategy to gain public support and the consolidation of the government, Calderón 
declared a war against organized crime.426 It produced an initial replacement of migration 
for security as the leading concern of Mexico and for its bilateral relations with the 
United States. However, the spillover of violence into Mexico and Central America, and 
the economic crisis of 2008, produced new patterns of migration that brought the topic 
back for discussion. For instance, from 2005 to 2010, voluntary returned migration of 
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Mexicans was greater that the flow of illegal immigration to the United States,427 and 
transit migration from Central America to the United States increased dramatically.428 
Therefore, the Mexican government faced the dilemma of implementing border security 
measures against organized crime and, simultaneously, actions to regulate and protect 
transit migrants. 
The Calderón administration prioritized national security concerns and the fight 
against organized crime, expanding the presence of security agencies and the armed 
forces along the southern border. Likewise, this administration made attempts to improve 
the management of the border and migration flows through the modernization of 
institutions and infrastructure, regularization programs, and the implementation of new 
types of visas.429 The Fox administration offered to close the border in exchange for 
migration reform in the United States, but got nothing in return; with Bush still in office, 
it offered poor incentives for Calderon to continue with restrictive measures that proved 
to be ineffective. The degradation of security throughout Mexico reached the southern 
border of the country and the migratory routes. Its effects were worst over illegal 
immigrants because of their vulnerability and the lack of government preparedness to 
attend this new phenomenon. The abuses and violations of illegal immigrants attracted 
the attention of non-state actors that complained against the government to adopt a new 
migration policy based on humanitarian principles. 
Considering migration policy, the Calderon administration did not have the 
leverage to negotiate an immigration reform with the United States that would give it 
more freedom on deciding the border model to be implemented. Initially the 
administration considered that Central American illegal immigration was particularly for 
economic reasons, and it proposed measures oriented to foster economic development 
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and provide more opportunities to regional migrants. However, violence related to 
Mexican Transnational Organized Crime Groups and Central American gangs produced 
forced migration that could not be solved by closing the border or through regularization 
and temporary-worker programs. As described in the following sections, the Calderon 
administration proposed a plan to bring legality and opportunities to the southern region 
of Mexico, but when the fight against organized crime was set as a priority, it eclipsed 
most of the border reordering efforts. 
1. Discursive Gap 
The first gap identifies the distance between the political discourse of the 
Calderón administration and its translation into specific plans, programs, and reforms. 
The migration perspective of that administration is evident in public statements and the 
National Development Plan 2006–2012. For instance, on December 14, 2006, in a visit to 
the southern region of the country, President Calderón announced the implementation of 
a plan for the security of the border that would consist of the regularization of the 
migratory status of border residents and the establishment of Joint Operation Units 
(Unidades Mixtas). These organizations would be conformed by elements of the Federal 
Police, National Migration Institute, and the Chiapas Border Police.430 Likewise, he 
declared in a press conference at a Plan Puebla-Panama summit in 2007 that his 
government would foster border security, processes to facilitate legal migration flows, 
and the modernization of infrastructure and migration laws.431 He affirmed that it was 
possible to establish a secure border and simultaneously protect migrants.432 
The Calderón administration made a distinction between border security and the 
regulation of migration. It ordered the implementation of specific measures for the 
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control of the border as the Joint Operation Units that would serve to provide security and 
control of migration flows. For the regulation of migration flows, President Calderón 
established new types of visas, temporary-worker programs, and promised measures to 
punish corruption and abuses against migrants.433 He also made clear that the reordering 
of the border was designed to increase the security of the region and to fight organized 
crime because security was a higher priority.434 Likewise, Commissioner of the National 
Migration Institute Salvador Beltrán del Río commented that the reordering of the border 
was not oriented to suppress or secure migrants, if not to improve the management of the 
border and to regulate and protect migration flows from corruption and organized 
crime.435 These statements were the prelude for the subordination of migration issues to 
security concerns. 
The Mexican Congress also manifested its vision of security and migration. Some 
Senators declared that national security demanded the protection of the sovereignty and 
integrity of the country from internal and external threats; however, they did not identify 
migration as national security issue. In contrast, they argued that because of the 
characteristics of migration flows and their socioeconomic impact in the country, they 
had to be seen as an opportunity for regional development and not as a risk for national 
security.436 Congress played a fundamental role in the regulation of migration with the 
reform of the General Population Law in 2008 and the enactment of the Migration Law in 
2011. Therefore, the Mexican Congress was consistent between its arguments and its 
actions.  
The National Development Plan 2007–2012 included for the first time clauses for 
the reordering of the Mexican borders and for the protection of illegal immigrants. For 
this purpose, the plan distinguished between migration management and border security, 
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describing specific objectives and strategies for each of those activities.437 For instance, 
paragraph 1.9 Border Security explained that borders must be doors for development and 
not for illegal activities, and that it was possible to enforce the law and simultaneously to 
protect human rights.438 It proposes as strategies the integration of Joint Units with the 
cooperation of the armed forces to guarantee the security at the borders and the protection 
of migrants from organized crime. It also aims at the creation of communication channels 
to share information and strategies with neighbor countries to improve the regulation of 
migration flows and the eradication of organized crime and terrorism in the region.439 
For the regulation of migration, paragraph 5.9 Mexicans in the Exterior and 
Migration identified the need to promote the protection of Mexican emigrants and to 
offer the same protection to immigrants in the country. The objectives defined for the 
regulation of migration were the construction of a new migration culture directed to 
reduce the incentives to migrate through economic development instead of restrictive 
measures. The strategies described include the implementation of the Plan for the 
Reordering of the Southern Border of Mexico, whose purpose was the establishment of 
legal channels and programs to improve the movement, documentation, and protection of 
migrants in the region, the reduction of migration incentives for illegality, and the 
regularization of their migratory status.440 
The Calderón administration was consistent in translating public statements into 
the National Development Plan 2007–2012 and in implementing specific measures to 
secure the southern border of Mexico and regulate migration flows. The best examples 
are the implementation of the Plan for the Reordering of the Southern Border of Mexico, 
creation of the Joint Operation Units, establishment of the Migration Form for Border 
Workers (FMTF), modernization of border infrastructure, reforms to the General 
Population Law in 2008, and enactment of the Migration Law in 2011. Furthermore, the 
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Mexican government increased its international cooperation with the enactment of 
instruments such as The Mérida Initiative and “Beyond Mérida,”441 the strengthening of 
the High Level Groups on Border Security (GANSEF) with Guatemala, Belize, and 
Honduras,442 and the continuation of the Plan Puebla-Panama, renamed the 
Mesoamerican Project.443 
2. Operational Gap 
The second gap represents the distance between the enactment of plans for the 
regulation of illegal immigration along the southern border of Mexico and their 
implementation considering the clear statement of objectives and strategies, the 
assignment of resources, and the coordination of efforts. For the assessment of this gap, 
the Plan for the Reordering of the Southern Border of Mexico is used as point of 
reference. The Performance Reports of the Calderón administration are used as sources of 
information to determine the implementation of the migration policies of Mexico. 
Furthermore, an analysis of migration reforms is included, since they changed the essence 
of policies and plans. 
a. Objectives and Strategies 
Mexico has made efforts to address the problems of its southern border, and it has 
changed its plans and programs according to domestic and international contexts. 
Government efforts started in 2001 with the implementation of the Southern Plan, but the 
results to regulate illegal immigration and to promote a U.S. migration reform failed, and 
the plan ended in 2003. The next antecedent was the Proposal of Comprehensive 
Immigration Policy for the Southern Border of Mexico released in 2005. This proposal 
included as objectives the facilitation of regional migration flows, the Protection of 
migrants’ rights, the strengthening of border security, and the modernization of migration 
management processes. The proposal was not implemented, but it served as a model for 
the definition of the migration policy of the Calderon government. The Plan for the 
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Reordering of the Southern Border of Mexico was launched on December 15, 2006, just 
two weeks after President Calderon took office. The strategies defined in the plan 
included initiatives to respect and protect the rights of migrants, promote economic 
development in labor regions, and improve the quality of services and migration 
management. 
In a general sense, the Calderón administration was capable of developing, for the 
first time in Mexico, a specific plan for the management of the southern border of 
Mexico. It distinguished the need to secure the border and, simultaneously, the 
responsibility to manage and protect the increasing flows of Central American illegal 
immigrants directed to Mexico and the United States. The objectives and strategies were 
broadly defined; however, they represented a guide for migration and security agencies to 
implement programs and coordinate efforts toward common goals. Resources and 
instruments implemented to accomplish migration policies are assessed in the next 
section.  
b. Resources 
After the determination of plans and policies to regulate illegal immigration and 
their objectives, the next step is the assignment of resources. For instance, the National 
Migration Institute in 2006 was approximately $150 million, and in 2011 it was $272 
million.444 In addition, this institute obtained resources from migration fees, which from 
2006 to 2011, accumulated $1,850 million.445 Therefore, the assessment of resources for 
the regulation of illegal immigration is difficult because the National Migration Institute 
does not have a fixed budget. Likewise, there is no available information about how the 
budget is expended. The Fundar Research and Analysis Center presented an assessment 
of the 2011 budget of the National Migration Institute, and it concludes that 82 percent is 
used for the management of migration, 11 percent for migrant protection programs, 6 
percent for the maintenance of infrastructure and repatriation programs, and 1 percent for 
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the support of migrants.446 Despite the contributions and novelty of this report, there is 
no additional information about other years and agencies to conclude that financial 
resources are efficiently allocated and spent. In addition to the assignment of resources, 
the government provided legal tools and designed programs for the regulation of illegal 
immigrants, which are assessed in the next section. 
(1) Regularization and Protection 
The Calderón administration understood that economic factors produced Central 
American illegal immigration, and for that purpose it created and updated instruments to 
facilitate the legal entrance and residency of migrants in the southern region of the 
country. The Migratory Form for Border Workers (FMTF) was implemented to allow 
Guatemalan temporary workers to work in the states of Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, 
and Quintana Roo for up to one year. The Local Migratory Form for Visitors (FMVL) 
gave access to border residents to 72 cities in the states of Chiapas, Tabasco, and 
Campeche for up to three days. The government also implemented the Program for the 
Regularization of Migrants from 2007 to 2011.447 To protect the integrity and dignity of 
migrants, the Calderón administration continued with the repatriation of Central 
American illegal immigrants to Guatemala under the Memorandum of Understanding for 
the Orderly, Dignified, Agile and Safe Repatriation from Mexico to Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.448 
For the protection of migrants in transit to Mexico, the Calderon administration 
expanded the Beta groups on the southern border to rescue migrants from dangerous 
situations and to provide them information, judicial support, medicines, and food. The 
activities have caused controversy because some critics argue that Mexico is encouraging 
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illegal immigration. However, because of distrust, illegal immigrants are reluctant to 
accept the help of Beta agents and other Mexican authorities.449 In 2007, as a result of the 
considerable increment of unaccompanied children migrants in transit to Mexico, the 
government implemented another humanitarian group, the Officers for the Protection of 
Infant Migrants (OPIS). In addition, the National Migration Institute established the 
Model for the Protection of Rights of Unaccompanied Children and Adolescents. This 
model was considered as a successful practice and has been replicated in Central 
America.450 For instance, OPI officials in 2011 assisted 2,717 unaccompanied foreign 
children.451 
The Calderon administration took an important step in updating the legal 
framework for the regulation of migration in the country. Since 2006, the government 
implemented new detention procedures that included a voluntary repatriation program to 
accelerate the repatriation of migrants.452 The government also promoted the amendment 
of the General Population Law on various occasions. The 2008 reform decriminalized 
illegal immigration, which had contemplated a punishment of up to ten years of prison 
and a fine.453 In 2009, a provision was included for the creation of the National Council 
of Population, and, in 2010, penalties against migrant smugglers and their accomplices 
were increased to up to 16 years of prison.454 
The most important reform occurred in May 2011 with the enactment of the 
Migration Law. Civil society and Central American governments had been pressuring the 
Mexican government to protect illegal immigrants from abuses and violations on its 
transit to Mexico. But it was only after the massacre of 72 Central American illegal 
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immigrants in San Fernando, Tamaulipas, in August 2010 that Congress and President 
Calderón took those demands seriously.455 The guiding principles of the Migration Law 
are respect for migrants’ rights, equality between Mexicans and migrants, shared 
responsibility with other nations, ease of population movement that is both orderly and 
secure, congruence with regional labor markets, and family reunification.456 These 
principles are consistent with the foreign policy of the Calderón administration related to 
the protection and regularization of Mexican migrants in the United States. 
The Migration Law gives a framework to the National Migration Institute to 
regulate migration for the developing of strategies. However, this institution must refine 
its processes and train its personal for the application of the Migration Law and its 
regulation. Francisco Alba argues that “it is not yet possible to judge the full range of the 
law’s impacts, given the law’s broad objectives.”457 Other authors agree that the law 
provides more protection to migrants, but it is extremely general to regulate migration, 
leaving a gap that can lead to discretion and corruption.458 However, it represents the 
recognition of Mexico as a transit country and the responsibility it has to control its 
border and simultaneously to protect and regulate illegal immigration. The major 
criticism of the Migration Law is its lack of protection for transit migrants.459 The 
implementation of humanitarian or transit visas could have provided protection and 
certainty to these flows, but it was against the foreign policy and relations of Mexico. 
(2) Institutions 
For the strengthening of the National Migration Institute as the responsible 
agency for the enforcement of migration laws, the Calderón administration considered the 
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modernization and increase of infrastructure and the implementation of manuals and 
information systems. For instance, on January 29, 2010, the government published the 
Manual of Migration Criteria and Procedures (MCTM), whose objective was the 
simplification of migration processes and the use of technology. For this purpose, the 
National Migration Institute launched the Electronic System for Immigration Procedures 
(SETRAM) to manage and generate real-time information of migration records.460 The 
government made efforts to increase migration facilities and modernize others for 
providing a more efficient and dignified service. For example, it implemented the 
Program for the Dignity of Migration Stations. Through this program, 2007 saw the 
construction of two migration stations in Janos, Chihuahua and Acayucan, Veracruz, and 
10 others were remodeled.461 In 2011, the Calderon government had in operation 35 
detention centers and 23 temporary stations with the capacity to accommodate 4,300 
people simultaneously.462  
To improve the execution of its functions, the National Migration Institute 
fostered the professionalization of its members and a culture of service and honesty. 
Migration agents received training from national and international organizations to serve 
as Officials for the Protection of Infant Migrants.463 Furthermore, the institution created a 
permanent program for training in human rights issues, the Migration Law, and processes 
to prevent and address the migrant victims of trafficking, kidnapping, and other crimes. 
In 2011, several courses were offered with the participation of 17,072 public servants.464 
In addition to training, the institute made significant efforts to eradicate corruption.  
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(3) Economic programs 
The Calderon administration identified economic factors as the principal incentive 
for Central American illegal immigrants to leave their countries. In consequence, this 
government launched several programs to improve the economic conditions of the region 
and the level of life in migrant expulsion regions. For instance, the Program for the 
Creation of Employment in Marginal Zones (PCEZM) under the control of the Secretary 
of Economy fostered the economic development of the region through the granting of 
resources for infrastructure in marginal areas. Under this project, $17 million were 
provided for productive projects in the states of Chiapas, Estado de México, Guanajuato, 
and Oaxaca y Yucatán, which would allow the creation of 4,168 new jobs.465 
The government also continued with the Plan Puebla-Panamá, renamed as The 
Mesoamerican Project. The purpose of this program was the integration and economic 
development of the region with the implementation of productive programs and 
infrastructure. The governments of the region affirmed that better opportunities in 
migrant expulsion regions would contribute to the security of borders and the reduction 
of illegal immigration.466 The areas of interest of the project were trade facilitation and 
competitiveness, energy integration, telecommunications, health, environment, and 
housing. The only concrete projects have been an electric interconnection between 
Mexico and Guatemala, the Mesoamerican Public Health System (SMPS), and the 
Central American Social Housing Development Program. There are, however, no specific 
reports on these projects and how each contributed to reduce illegal immigration. 
(4) Coordination 
The Calderon administration identified the need to coordinate efforts to control 
the border and provide protection to illegal immigrants entering and crossing the country. 
For instance, the government ordered the integration of the Joint Operation Units with the 
participation of the General Attorney’s Office, the Federal Police, the Secretary of the 
Interior, the National Migration Institute, state police corporations, and the collaboration 
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of the armed forces. The purpose of these units was to secure the border and provide 
protection to the inhabitants of the border region and illegal immigrants.467 The 
government tried to coordinate the efforts of agencies with different responsibilities such 
as combating crime, protecting national security, and regulating migration for border 
control and the protection of migrants. Security agencies were absorbed in combating 
organized crime, and their training in migration regulations and humanitarian issues was 
not the best; therefore, security and migrant protection efforts became complicated. 
Despite the distinction that the government tried to make, security always took 
precedent over migration issues. For instance, on April 15, 2011, at the headquarters of 
the Mexican Navy, a conference of the High-Level Group for the Mexico–Guatemala–
Belize Border to place, with the assistance of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, CISEN, 
the National Migration Institute, representatives of the Armed Forces of Mexico, 
Guatemala and Belize, and the commanders of the U.S. Northern and Southern 
Commands. The purpose of the meeting was the presentation of the realities of the 
Southern Border of Mexico and the discussion of the regional responsibility in matters of 
shared border and national security strategies of the countries involved.468 Therefore, 
migration became part of security, and not a humanitarian and regional integration issue. 
The Calderon Administration ordered the coordination among security and 
migration agencies for the control the border and to regulate migration, but there was no 
body or authority completely responsible for the execution and supervision of these 
missions. Therefore, cooperation and coordination was a matter of will and not an 
obligation. The annual reports of the execution of the National Development Plan contain 
the results of individual and joint operations of security agencies. For instance, according 
to the annual report of 2008, the Federal Police performed joint operations with local 
authorities that resulted in the handing over of 6,816 illegal immigrants to migration 
authorities.469 In the 2011 annual report, the Federal Police reported the detention of 
2,463 illegal immigrants in border states, but did not specify the coordination with other 
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agencies.470 Furthermore, none of the six reports presented by the Calderon 
administration included specific results from the Joint Operation Units that would be the 
operative body of the border security strategy. 
The coordination between security agencies and the armed forces occurred 
basically for combating organized crime. The Army and the Navy executed patrols in 
urban areas with the cooperation of the Federal Police; in border security tasks, however, 
the involvement of civil security and migration agencies was minimal. The results 
presented in the annual reports of the Calderón Administration are from urban patrols and 
not from the enforcement of the border. For instance, in 2007, the Navy in coordination 
with the Secretary of Public security executed urban patrols that resulted in the detention 
of 623 illegal immigrants.471 In 2008, the Navy reported a detention of 984 illegal 
immigrants as a result of individual and joint operations.472 And in 2009, it reported the 
detention of 259 illegal immigrants.473 Along with these results, the report includes the 
detention of criminals and the seizure of drugs and weapons, indicating the tendency of 
the government to relate security with migration. 
In the international arena, the Calderón government realized important efforts to 
increase cooperation with Guatemala and Belize. However, the relation between security 
and illegal immigration persisted at the international level.  For instance, the High-Level 
Group of Border Security between those countries and Mexico was reactivated in 2008 
with the purpose of improving border security and extending the group’s spectrum to 
social issues. Likewise, the results of regional operations like the South Border Joint 
Operation between Guatemala and Mexico reported 2009 results to include the detention 
of 528 illegal immigrants, and seizure of 45 rounds of ammunition and eight stolen 
vehicles.474 These results illustrate that security operations were used to deter illegal 
immigration, and that there was no compromise with the expansion of joint operations. 
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3. Efficiency Gap 
This gap is related to the effectiveness of the plans and programs to regulate 
illegal immigration on the southern border of Mexico. Observations from previous gaps 
illustrate that the Calderon government was assertive in identifying the need to control 
the border and to protect illegal immigrants. However, plans and programs implemented 
had broadly-defined objectives, strategies, and responsibilities that did not contribute to 
their effective implementation. The government placed emphasis on combating organized 
crime throughout the country, and migration issues passed to second place. Coordination 
among agencies and different levels of government focused on security issues and not on 
the regulation of migration. The government assigned resources to control the border, 
increasing the presence of security agencies. Instead of deterring the flows of illegal 
immigrants and organized crime, however, they evolved and collided, resulting in 
disastrous consequences for migrants.  
For the regulation of migration, the Calderon administration provided legal 
channels to draw migrants from illegality, but it offered opportunities for regional rather 
than transit migrants. All efforts had good intentions, but they were not based on a sound 
diagnosis of the southern border of Mexico, nor the origins and patterns of Central 
American illegal immigration in transit. The government believed that, by improving the 
economic conditions of the region, the incentives of Central Americans to migrate would 
be reduced, ignoring other characteristics and motives producing it. Furthermore, the war 
against organized crime had harmful effects in Central America, forcing more migration; 
hence, the government tried to regulate a problem that helped to worsen.  
The evaluation of the measures implemented was another problem. The annual 
reports of the government did not present an analysis or at least a description of how the 
plans to control the border and regulate migration were operating, their costs and 
benefits. And since there was no agency directly responsible for the joint plans and 
operations implemented to control the border, their supervision and accountability were 
difficult. The major problem in trying to determine the effectiveness of plans and 
programs to regulate illegal immigration during the Calderón administration is their 
combination with security issues, the lack of specific objectives and assignment of 
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responsibilities for their implementation, and the absence of information on the results 
obtained with each operation.  
The Calderon administration made important advances in migration issues. For 
instance, it was able to define the Plan for the Reordering of the Southern Border of 
Mexico to regulate illegal immigration, considering social, economic and security factors. 
Furthermore, the government reformed the legal migration framework to increase the 
protection and opportunities for migrants, established new visas and permits to facilitate 
legal border crossings, and implemented temporary-worker and regularization programs. 
The National Migration Institute was reinforced with the creation of Officers for the 
Protection of Migrants, the establishments of new migration stations, the creation of the 
National Population Council and the Manual of Migration Criteria and Procedures, the 
implementation of information systems, and the development of training programs. 
However, these programs lost strength with the involvement of the government in the war 
against organized crime, and the government failed to adapt them to new migration 
patterns.  
The Plan for the Reordering of the Southern Border of Mexico was created to lead 
government efforts to secure the border and regulate illegal immigration, but after the 
President announced this plan in 2006 and included it in the National Development Plan, 
it disappeared from official references. For instance, in the annual government reports, 
nothing was mentioned about this plan. Likewise, the Senate in Gazette 369 of March 28, 
2012, manifested that Congress ignored the actions and results of the implementation of 
the plan and its update as a consequence of the enactment of the Migration Law. Senators 
mentioned that they needed information about the effect that the plan had in protecting 
migrant rights and its contribution to the security and development of the region.475 The 
involvement of Congress to oversee the execution of government plans is remarkable, but 
doing it at the end of the administration was unproductive. 
The Calderón administration, through programs such as the Migratory Form for 
Border Workers (FMTF) and the Local Migratory Form for Visitors (FMVL), tried to 
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regulate migration, giving more opportunities for illegal immigrants to adopt legal 
channels for entering Mexico. The FMTF and the FMVL were offered for border 
residents, excluding the Hondurans that represented the faster-growing illegal 
immigration flow. Many Central Americans enter Mexico through illegal POEs to buy 
goods and return to their countries, and if they use the FMVL to enter Mexico, they 
would not be able to return with all that merchandise without paying taxes. Temporary 
regional migrants, therefore, have few incentives to use formal crossings. Furthermore, 
the infrastructure of border bridges and legal POEs was not enough to handle effectively 
the movement of people and goods. 
The National Migration Institute was reinforced with the construction of new 
facilities, training, and the creation of specialized groups, but they were insufficient to 
protect migrants and eradicate corruption in that institution. The new facilities were 
migration stations for the lodging of migrants waiting to be repatriated instead of border 
infrastructure and checkpoints. Furthermore, an evaluation of the Mexican Secretary of 
Communications and Transportation concluded that the eight legal POEs between 
Mexico and Guatemala had problems of insecurity, saturation of service, traffic 
congestion, and lack of infrastructure,476 and these deficiencies were not addressed.  
Courses on human rights and migration processes were implemented to 
professionalize the National Migration Institute; however, corruption and abuses 
continued. For instance, in 2008, it received 244 official complaints for arbitrary 
detention, extortion, and abuses, and this number increased to 415 in 2010. In 2011, the 
National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) placed the National Migration Institute in 
third place for human rights violations, with 1,301 complains.477 However, there is no 
reliable information about the sanctions to migration officials. According to Human 
Rights Watch, the National Migration Institute fired 350 agents linked to organized 
crime.478 Other reports indicate that between August 2010 and May 2011, the institute 
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sanctioned 200 agents for crimes against migrants and corruption.479 According to 
information provided by the National Migration Institute in response to a resolution of 
the Federal Institution for the Access to Information (IFAI), only 21 migration agents 
were sanctioned for violations of migrants’ human rights.480 Regardless of all efforts to 
eradicate corruption, eight migration officials were found involved in the massacre of San 
Fernando, proving the level of deterioration in the institution.481 
The Calderon administration argued that improving the economic conditions of 
migration expulsion zones would reduce the incentives to migrate. And for that purpose, 
it implemented the Program for the Creation of Employment in Marginal Zones 
(PCEZM) and continued with the Mesoamerica Project. The PCEZM granted credits to 
small and medium companies of specific communities through a process that included 
evaluation and monitoring.482 However, it was poverty and not emigration that decided 
which communities to support, and resources were granted according to the feasibility of 
projects rather than to their impact in reducing migration. Furthermore, this program was 
not directly related to the regulation of transit migration, and there is no assessment 
indicating that illegal immigrants come only from marginal zones. The Mesoamerica 
Project was successful in specific areas as energy distribution, but there is no possible 
way to argue that it has an impact in illegal immigration prevention. 
The most important advance of the Calderon administration to regulate illegal 
immigration was the reforms to the General Population Law and the Migration Reform. 
Although it is not possible to assess their application, some issues have called the 
attention of non-state actors. First, the Migration Law did not include a provision to grant 
a transit visa for humanitarian purposes that would allow Central Americans to cross 
Mexico and reach the United States legally, reducing the vulnerability of illegal 
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immigrants. Second, with the participation of security agencies in the enforcement of 
migration laws, migrants were treated as criminals even though they are not. Third, there 
is no information available about the promotion of the new migration provisions that 
could urge migrants to use them. Finally, the Migration Law facilitated the regulation of 
migration, but the government strategies continued to be restrictive and oriented to 
security. 
The Calderón administration used the security arrangements to regulate migration. 
The use of belts of control, multiple check points, and the militarization of the border that 
characterized the Southern Plan during the Fox government to regulate migration were 
not explicit in the Plan for the Reordering of the Southern Border of Mexico, but 
measures implemented were even tougher. The involvement of more security forces to 
secure the border and fight organized crime was used evenly to enforce migration laws 
and to watch drug trafficking routes. Therefore, the war against organized crime 
dispersed efforts to regulate migration and made migrants more vulnerable to organized 
crime and corrupts officials. 
C. THE REGULATION OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE ENRIQUE 
PEÑA NIETO ADMINISTRATION 
Enrique Peña Nieto took office as President of Mexico in December 2012. With 
two years in power, is difficult to reach conclusions about the performance of its 
government in the regulation of illegal immigration along the southern border of the 
country. Furthermore, academic assessments about the migration policy of the Peña Nieto 
administration and official reports are limited. However, it is important to identify the 
political discourse of this administration on migration issues and the instruments in place 
that will lead the efforts of the government. The analysis presented in this section is 
focused on the statements given by President Peña Nieto, articles in newspapers, the 
National Development Plan 2013–2018, and other official documents. The objective is to 
identify the vision of this administration to regulate migration, how that vision has been 
embodied in plans and programs, and the characteristics of those instruments to facilitate 




During his political campaign, Enrique Peña Nieto was aware that one of the 
priorities of civil society was insecurity, including its effects on illegal immigrants. With 
the advantage he had over the rest of the competitors for the presidency, he took a 
discrete stand, making just vague comments about his security strategy and his position in 
migration issues. For some experts, President Peña Nieto did not consider migration a top 
priority, and they predicted that the administration would take a discrete strategy in the 
promotion of migration reform in the United States as during the Calderón 
administration.483 In his 266 campaign promises, he did not include any related to 
migration.484 However, the Electoral Platform 2012–2018 of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, which was used during the Peña Nieto campaign, includes specific 
migration issues. For instance, it affirmed the responsibility of the state to protect the 
human rights of migrants and the necessity to establish regional agreements to regulate 
migration. It also recognized that civil society and non-state actors must be invited to 
participate in the definition and implementation of migration policies.485 
The Peña Nieto administration identified the social, economic, political, and 
security factors related to migration, but it soon fell into contradictions. On one hand, the 
government recognized that migration could only be regulated with a regional and 
integral perspective and not as a problem that could be solved with fences and 
policing.486 But on the other hand, it mentioned the intention of promoting a regional 
security policy with the United States and Canada that includes migration.487 Therefore, 
it was possible to infer the securitization of migration during this administration. 
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The context of the new government is complicated because it has to deal with the 
atmosphere of insecurity, violence, organized crime, and the abuses against migrants. The 
efforts of previous administrations to strengthen the National Migration Institute did not 
have the intended results. Furthermore, the administration has to face the challenge to 
implement the new migration legal framework with the respective learning curve and the 
scandals of corruption and weaknesses of migration and security agencies. It is also 
expected that the administration will implement provisions to control the southern border 
of the country to foster regional integration. According to Adam Isacson, Maureen 
Meyer, and Gabriela Morales, President Peña Nieto is interested in a more concerted 
security effort on the southern border of the country with support from the United States. 
They argue that the creation of the 21st Century Border defined in the Mérida Initiative 
will gain relevance during the Peña administration.488 Therefore, it can be anticipated 
that the Mexican government will use a strategy similar to the one used during the Fox 
administration. 
As described in Chapter II, the number of Central American illegal immigrants 
reaching the United States has increased considerably, including unaccompanied infant 
illegal immigrants. Civil society, non-state actors, and the media have been active on 
denunciating the suffering of migrants and influencing public opinion to pressure the 
Mexican and U.S. governments to protect migrants and offer an humanitarian response to 
their needs. This variable was not present during the application of the Southern Plan in 
2001. Hence, the measures implemented by the Peña Nieto administration have to 
respond to the insecurity of the country and simultaneously to the protection of migrants. 
2. Plans and Programs  
An accomplishment of the Peña Nieto administration is the recognition of the 
vulnerability of the southern border of the country and the necessity of a model for the 
management of the border.489 The starting point for the design and implementation of 
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migration policies is the National Development Plan 2013–2018. It contains objectives 
and strategies for the regulation of migration. Some issues stand out from this plan. First, 
it recognizes the complexity of the Mexican borders and the lag that the southern region 
has in comparison with the north. Second, the plan affirms that a model is needed for the 
management of the border. Third, it proposes the implementation of an integral program 
for the regulation of migration with the participation of civil society and under 
humanitarian principles. Fourth, the plan identifies that migration policies must be 
originated from a democratic planning process, based on information and statistics, and 
constantly evaluated. Finally, it acknowledges that not all illegal immigrants are equal, 
and that vulnerable groups require special attention. Therefore, this plan represents an 
advance in the regulation of illegal immigration in comparison with previous 
administrations. 
To face the challenge of the regulation of migration, the Peña Nieto 
administration convened civil society and non-state actors for the formulation of a 
migration policy. During the first half of 2013, this administration began the development 
of the Special Migration Program 2014–2018 with the participation of the agencies 
involved in the regulation of migration, academics, civil society, and all branches and 
levels of government.490 For the design of the program, the Peña Nieto administration 
used the National Democratic Planning System that included a diagnostic of illegal 
immigration in the country in its stages of origin, transit, destination, and return.  
Non-state actors and civil society participated in the elaboration of the program 
through five regional forums between October and December 2013, in which proposals 
were discussed.491 This program can be summarized in four points: Optimize the 
administrative process for immigration, ensure the protection of the rights of migrants, 
increase border security, and improve equipment, technology, and infrastructure.492 
Likewise, the government created the Migration Policy Unit (UPM), the National 
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Migration Institute’s Citizen Council, and the Advisory Council on Migration Policy of 
the Ministry of the Interior to propose and implement the migration policy of the 
country.493 
One accomplishment of the actual Mexican administration is the definition of 
specific programs for the development of the southern region of the country, for the 
prevention of trafficking in persons, for the regulation of migration, for public security 
procurement, and for national security.494 For instance, in November 2013, President 
Peña Nieto launched the Support Program for the Border Areas with a budget of 
approximately $ 2.36 billion. This program contains six actions: the closure of customs 
checkpoints (Garitas), economic support to low-income families, the promotion of 
tourism, special measures to protect consumers, infrastructure projects, and capitalization 
of the National Development Bank for the lending of credits.495 These actions are 
oriented to promote regional economic development and facilitate trade. The plan did not 
contain any migration or security provisions when it was launched. However, this 
approach and the essence of the Special Migration Program 2014–2018 changed with the 
implementation of other programs related to security support by the United States.496  
In July 2014, the Peña Nieto administration implemented the South Border 
Program with the purposes of protecting the human rights of migrants in transit through 
Mexico and the reordering of legal Points of Entry (POEs) to foster regional security and 
development. The program includes five strategies. First, the enforcement of formal and 
orderly border crossings to give certainty and security to migration flows and to maintain 
migration records. This strategy includes the implementation of the Regional Visitor Card 
(TVR). Second, border management and greater security for migrants including the 
enhancement of border infrastructure and operation of legal POEs and the transformation 
of customs checkpoints in Integral Attention Centers for Border Transit (CAITFs). 
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Likewise, this strategy includes the reinforcement of mobile checkpoints to grant the 
order and legality of the flows of people and goods across the southern border. Third, the 
expansion of migrant social protection with medical units, the modernization of migration 
stations, cooperation with humanitarian organizations, and support to the National 
System for the Integral Development of the Family (DIF) that provides temporary shelter 
to unaccompanied infant illegal immigrants. Fourth, foster regional co-responsibility with 
the participation of the government in international migration forums. Finally, promote 
interagency coordination with the creation of the Coordination for the Integral Attention 
of Migration in the South Border.497 
The South Program is a combination of the Southern Plan implemented during the 
Fox administration and the Plan for the Reordering of the Southern Border of the 
Calderón government. It includes security measures, border restrictions, and calls for the 
reordering of the border for the regulation and protection of migrants. The South Program 
considers the reinforcement of the participation of security agencies to secure the border, 
bringing again the idea of mobile checkpoints and belts of control to combat organized 
crime while protecting illegal immigrants.498 However, this program is more specific and 
coherent with the realities of the border. For instance, the program identifies five 
different border regions for its management, which are related with migration routes and 
the geography of the southern border.499 Furthermore, the belts of control include internal 
points in Huixtla, Comitán, Palenque and Playas de Catazajá, which are important nodes 
in the migration routes.  
Another improvement of the plan consists of the organization of the South 
Program. The Mexican Navy is assigned for the coordination of security efforts at the 
border.500 The deployment of security forces along the border is coordinated with 
                                                 
497 “Pone en Marcha el Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto el Programa Frontera Sur,” Presidencia de la 
República, last updated July 07, 2014, http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/articulos-prensa/pone-en-marcha-el-
presidente-enrique-pena-nieto-el-programa-frontera-sur/. 
498 Isacson, Meyer, and Morales, Mexico’s Other Border, 21. 
499 “Despliega Marina Plan de Vigilancia en Frontera Sur,” El Diario.mx (September 08, 2013), 




Guatemala, the checkpoints are mixed with agents of the three levels of government,501 
and the CAITFs are established with the participation of the National Migration Institute, 
Customs, the Federal Police, and the armed forces.502 The security agencies involved in 
the program will have better equipment to operate along the border, and the National 
Migration Institute will have the capacity to register biometric information of migrants, 
consult data bases and share information in real time with other national and international 
agencies.503 
As in the Plan for the Reordering of the Southern Border, the South Plan lacks 
dispositions to facilitate transit migration. The efforts for the management of migration 
and the control of the border are oriented to allow regional movements in the southern-
border states. In April 2014, the Secretary of the Interior announced the implementation 
of the program Safe Passage (Paso Seguro) that would consists of temporary-worker 
programs and regional visitor cards to Guatemalans and Belizeans.504 Finally it was 
included in the South Program in the form of the TVR and the Border Worker Card. The 
TVR is a free instrument offered to border residents to enter Chiapas, Campeche, 
Quintana Roo, and Tabasco for up to 72 hours without need of a visa. Likewise, the 
Border Worker Card allows permanency in the southern states of the country to holders 
of this instrument and their families for up to a year.505 With these instruments, the Peña 
Nieto administration maintained the southern border open for regional movements as in 
previous administrations, but it could reduce informal crosses and foster family 
unification. However, this option results in no protection for transit migration. 
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To improve the regulation of migration along the southern border of the country, 
the Peña Nieto administration created the Coordination for the Integral Attention of 
Migrants.506 The government made this decision in response to the increase of Central 
American illegal immigrants crossing the country, and the exposure and criticism that 
railroad use has received. This body is responsible for synchronizing and monitoring 
migration policies and related actions, and the agencies involved in migration issues are 
obligated to agree to matters within their competence with the coordinator.507 However, 
there are no representatives of the different agencies in the coordination, communication 
and operation processes are not defined, authority and subordination relations are 
confusing, and this body does not have real power over the distribution of resources and 
the execution of operations. The government has already implemented the Special 
Program for Migration, the Migration Policy Unit, and the Advisory Council on 
Migration Policy. The creation of another institution—without defining its relation with 
previous programs, and without the organizational strength to execute its mission—is 
harmful to the regulation of migration. 
The implementation of several programs and institutions with similar missions, 
and the mixture of security responsibilities and arrangements with the regulation of 
migration complicates the understanding of what the Peña Nieto administration is trying 
to do. For instance, the Secretary of the Interior Miguel Osorio Chong declared that the 
South Program was not intended to close the border, but to prevent illegal immigrants 
from been victims of organized crime. He argues that the security arrangement will stop 
transit migrants without papers from entering the United States at the beginning of their 
journey north for their own safety. Osorio Chong recognized that previous 
administrations lacked a migration policy, demanding new strategies that include 
operations to prevent migrants from using the railroad known as “La Bestia.”508 
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Humberto Mayans Canabal, responsible for the Coordination for the Integral Attention of 
Migration in the Southern Border, pointed out that this strategy consisted of developing 
programs to guarantee the security of migrants, the eradication of organized crime groups 
harassing migrants, and the improvement of the railroad infrastructure. Mayans and other 
officials offered additional details for the implementation of the strategy. However, what 
is disturbing is that the only physical measure described to prevent the use of the railroad 
is its improvement to increase its speed of operation, a measure that could cause more 
harm to migrants.509 Furthermore, the Coordination does not have authority over security 
issues or the capacity to define security operations. 
The Peña Nieto administration has created several programs and organizations for 
the management of the southern border and the regulation of migration, but there is no 
information available to describe a coherent system and identify how it is working. With 
security and migration agencies operating independently but in coordination, and with 
different coordination agencies in charge, the lack of documentation and evaluation is 
understandable. International organizations and non-state actors mention that Mexican 
authorities are reluctant to provide information about the programs implemented to 
manage the southern border. For instance, a report from the Washington Office on Latin 
America mentions the lack of transparency from the government.510 This may be due to 
the resistance of agencies to be scrutinized by the public opinion, for national security, or 
because, indeed, the information does not exist. 
There is no information available to make conclusions regarding the efficacy of 
strategies the government used to manage the southern border of the country and regulate 
migration. But it is evident that the Peña Nieto administration has combined security and 
migration issues into a system that disregarded the good practices through which it was 
created. The government identified points of intervention and created instances for their 
attention, but the annexation of more bureaucracy without justification, and the lack of 
transparency, coordination, and evaluation will complicate the management of the 
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southern border and the regulation of migration. Moreover, the economic, social, 
security, and humanitarian factors of immigration must be rescued from the security 
arrangement that the government has implemented. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis sought to determine why plans and programs implemented by the 
Mexican government, since 2000, have been ineffective in regulating illegal immigration 
on the southern border of Mexico. The hypotheses proposed argued that plans and 
programs to regulate illegal immigration have failed because of deficiencies in the policy-
making processes and their implementation. Deficiencies related to the policy-making 
processes are related to an absence of policies, internal and external pressures, poorly 
defined or nonexistent objectives, lack of a legal framework, and policies developed 
without an integrated approach. Likewise, deficiencies in the implementation of plans 
and programs are related to corruption, a lack of coordination among various government 
levels and agencies, incoherence between objectives and resources, insufficient 
evaluation tools, and an absence of infrastructure and technology. 
To validate the hypotheses proposed, this study described Central American 
illegal immigration’s origins and trends, the attribute of Mexico as a transit country for 
migration, and the characteristics of the southern border of Mexico. The analysis was 
designed to identify the behavior and components of the system that migration plans and 
programs try to regulate and the points of intervention. Furthermore, migration policies 
implemented to control illegal immigration during the Vicente Fox administration from 
2000–2006, the Felipe Calderón administration from 2006–2012, and the current 
administration of Enrique Peña-Nieto were used as case studies. The methodology for the 
assessment of the case studies focused on three gaps. The first was the discursive gap, 
consisting of the difference between political discourse and the plans and programs 
proposed. The second was the operational gap that differentiates between the enactment 
of plans and programs and their implementation. Finally, the efficiency gap describes the 
impact that those plans and programs have on the regulation of Central American illegal 
immigration. 
The first step in the development of this study was the assessment of Central 
American illegal immigration in transit through Mexico. From the information presented 
in Chapter II, it is concluded that the causes of those migration flows are diverse, 
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including economic, social, and security factors. However, the influence that each exerts 
over Central American illegal immigration patterns has changed according to domestic 
and international contexts. Security issues were predominant during the twentieth century 
because of civil wars in Central America. Likewise, economic issues became relevant for 
defining migration trends with the adaptation of a neoliberal economy in that region, and 
the expansion of globalization and economic interdependence. Transnational organized 
crime in Central America and the related violence has again forced migration into the 
agenda of origin, transit, and destination countries. Furthermore, the social networks 
created with the mobility of people from Central America to the United States since the 
1980s, along with the interruption of circular migration, helped to produce illegal 
immigration flows that go beyond security and economic issues. Hence, the economic 
gap between North and Central America, the violence generated by Mexican cartels and 
Maras, and the strength of social networks make it less likely that illegal immigration can 
be regulated without integral and realistic policies that consider the combination of all 
conditions producing it. 
Mexico’s multifaceted character as a country of emigration, immigration, and 
transit makes it more and more difficult to regulate illegal immigration along its southern 
border. As an emigration country, Mexico has fostered policies for regional integration 
with the United States in economic and security issues, offering stricter control of its 
southern border in exchange for migration reform that favors Mexicans. As an 
immigration country, Mexico implemented several instruments such as temporary-worker 
permits, regularization programs, and border-resident visas. Likewise, the migration legal 
framework was reformed to provide more certainty and services to immigrants. However, 
Mexico has failed as a transit country because it has not implemented any instrument or 
policy to regulate and protect migration flows crossing it. For example, Mexico 
apprehends as many Central American illegal immigrants as does the United States. 
Although it decriminalized illegal immigration, transit migrants are unprotected from 
organized crime and corrupt authorities. 
From the analysis presented in Chapter III, it can be concluded that the southern 
border of Mexico is a complex problem due to its geopolitical conditions, the informal 
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relations between communities on both sides of the border, and the actors participating in 
its conceptualization; therefore, its control is difficult. The geographic features of the 
border, for example, facilitate illicit traffic through the jungles, mountains, and rivers. In 
contrast, these characteristics complicate its management. Furthermore, Mexico and 
Guatemala established the border to delineate each country, but they did not break the 
social, cultural, and economic links between border communities—links that were strong 
before the independence of both countries. Civil wars, economic crises, and the natural 
disasters that displaced Central Americans into Mexico reinforced those relations. In 
consequence, informal movements of people and goods across the borderland were 
established, becoming a habit and a necessity for the social and economic stability of the 
region, and blurring the border. Moreover, the historical centralism of the government, its 
tendency to look north, and the economic underdevelopment of the south intensified the 
abandonment of the southern border of the country. 
The complexities of the border, soft policy from the United States, and the 
recognition that Central American migration to southern Mexico was beneficial for 
regional development and integration pushed the government to adapt a vertical-border 
approach to regulate illegal immigration. It consisted of feeble controls along the border 
and tighter ones along main transport networks in the form of belts of control. Hence, the 
number of illegal points of entry proliferated and the migration routes diversified. The 
militarization of the border was designed to prevent the spillover of insurgent movements 
from Central America to Mexico, contain the insurgent movements in the region during 
the 1990s, and combat organized crime. Armed forces at the border participate in the 
control of illegal immigration, but their presence is not enough to contain those flows; 
furthermore, they lack the training and authority to enforce migration laws. The Mexican 
government oriented its efforts to more manageable areas like the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec, a zone in which all migration routes converge. However, the variety of 
transportation, the weak presence of the state, and the adaptation of illegal immigrants 
deteriorated the enforcement of the vertical border. 
The self-reinforcing cycle of measures and countermeasures between the 
government, organized crime, and illegal immigration complicate the control of the 
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border even more. Restrictive measures along main highways to control Central 
American illegal immigration in transit just made this phenomenon less visible, pushing 
migrants to take isolated routes and hire the services of professional smugglers. The 
vulnerability of illegal immigrants crossing Mexico in the shadows, in combination with 
a weak presence of the state—either to stop or to protect migrants—presented a business 
opportunity to organized crime. Zetas, Maras, local gangs, and coyotes extort, rape, 
traffic, and murder migrants, sometimes with the complicity of corrupt officials and the 
indifference of society. 
The illegal points of entry throughout the southern border of Mexico and the 
migration routes to cross the country have been identified, and the most dangerous routes 
have been documented by various sources. Also, there is evidence of the economic, 
social, and security factors producing and shaping illegal immigration flows. Considering 
that information, it was expected that—in addition to the acceptance of the complexity of 
closing the border and stopping transit migration—the Mexican government would 
design and implement plans and programs to regulate and protect migrants. To verify 
this, the thesis included the assessment of migration policies from three different 
administrations. 
From the assessment of the Fox administration, it can be concluded that the plans 
and programs implemented to regulate Central American illegal immigration along the 
southern border of Mexico failed. The discursive gap was almost non-existent because 
there was coherence between government statements and proposed migration policies; 
however, the operational and the efficiency gaps were evident. In sum, President Fox 
oriented his efforts to promote migration reform for the benefit of Mexican migrants; 
hence, measures implemented to control the southern border followed the foreign policy 
of the country and external pressures, relegating the regulation of illegal immigrants and 
their protection to the background. 
The absence of the discursive gap does not mean that plans and programs 
proposed were developed from a risk assessment, nor with a systemic approach and 
through a planning process that identified the origins and effects of illegal immigration, 
the points of intervention, and the role of non-state actors. To determine the character of 
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the operational gap, the assessment of the Fox administration considered the definition of 
objectives, the assignment of responsibilities and resources, and coordination. Plans and 
programs implemented during this government lacked those components. For instance, 
the Southern Plan’s objectives and strategies were broadly defined, and lacked resources, 
processes for coordination, and metrics for evaluation. Moreover, there was no agency 
with the authority and resources to control the border. The National Migration Institute, 
as coordinator, did not have the organizational strength, resources, professionalism, or 
continuity of their functionaries to carry out that responsibility. Furthermore, the Proposal 
of Integral Migration Policy for the Southern Border of Mexico, which could have 
contributed to the regulation of illegal immigration, was not implemented.  
Due to a lack of information, trying to determine the efficiency of plans and 
programs to regulate illegal immigration during the Fox administration is complicated. 
An increment of migrants deported is not enough indication of success. However, it is 
possible to conclude that those instruments failed because they were not designed for 
regulation but for restriction. The regulation of Central American illegal immigration was 
not an end in the Fox government; instead, it was a political tool used as a bargaining 
chip to obtain a U.S. migration reform on behalf of Mexican illegal immigrants residing 
in the United States. The government tried to close the border and to securitize illegal 
immigration, forgetting the economic, social, and security factors originating and shaping 
migration flows. Closing the border with belts of control isolated migrants and made 
them more vulnerable. The lack of a legal framework, according to the realities of the 
country and the conditions of its southern border, also complicated the execution of 
programs. Furthermore, the international agreements implemented were guided by 
security and not by regulatory concerns. 
The Calderón administration took an different approach from that of the Fox 
government. Instead of offering to close the border to the United States for migration 
reform, it declared a war against organized crime. Border management and the regulation 
of illegal immigration became part of government security. This administration argued 
that reordering the border would bring security to the region, and it was consistent in 
translating those statements into specific plans and programs. The best examples of the 
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country’s migration policy were the inclusion—for the first time in Mexico—of 
provisions for border security and the regulation of migration in a National Development 
Plan, the creation of the Plan for the Reordering of the Southern Border of Mexico, and 
the formation of Joint Operation Units. Hence, the discursive gap was non-existent 
because the Calderon government was assertive in translating the political discourse into 
actual plans and programs to control the border and to protect illegal immigrants.  
In the case of the operational gap, the plans and programs implemented during the 
Calderón administration had broadly-defined objectives, strategies, and responsibilities. 
The Plan for the Reordering of the Southern Border of Mexico, created to lead 
government efforts to secure the border and regulate illegal immigration, was mentioned 
in the National Development Plan but disappeared from further official reports as the 
Joint Operation Units. There is not enough information to determine the amount of 
resources designated to regulate migration, but it is possible to affirm that the government 
placed emphasis on combating organized crime throughout the country, and the 
regulation of Central American illegal immigration passed to second place. 
The Calderon administration provided legal channels for the regulation of 
migration, but they were focused on regional rather than transit migrants. These 
instruments were not based on a sound diagnosis of the southern border of Mexico, nor 
the origins and patterns of Central American illegal immigration in transit. It also 
implemented programs and designated resources to reinforce the organization and 
infrastructure of the National Migration Institute, but they lost strength with the 
involvement of the government in the war against organized crime. Furthermore, the 
government believed that, by improving the economic conditions of the region, the 
incentives of Central Americans to migrate would be reduced, ignoring other 
characteristics and motives involved in migration.  
The major problems in trying to determine the efficiency gap were the 
combination of the regulation of illegal immigration with security issues, the lack of 
specific objectives and assignment of responsibilities for their implementation, and the 
absence of information on the results obtained with each operation. The government 
increased the presence of security agencies; however, instead of controlling illegal 
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immigrants and organized crime, they evolved and collided, increasing the vulnerability 
of migrants. Furthermore, the war against organized crime had harmful effects in Central 
America, forcing more migration. In reality, the government tried to regulate a problem 
that it had helped to worsen. 
The most important advances of the Calderon administration to regulate illegal 
immigration were the reforms to the General Population Law and the enactment of 
Migration Law. Ironically, they were a product of the pressure of non-state actors 
fostering the protection of illegal immigrants in transit trough Mexico. These migrants 
became victims of the security strategy of the Calderon government. Although it is not 
possible to assess their application, the lack of a provision to grant a transit visa for 
humanitarian purposes that would allow Central Americans to cross Mexico and reach 
the United States has been highly criticized by non-state actors. Finally, the Migration 
Law facilitated the regulation of migration, but the government strategies continued to be 
restrictive and oriented to security. 
The Peña-Nieto administration started like any other with the recognition of the 
complexity of the Mexican borders and the need of a model to manage them. It 
implemented a democratic planning process, emphasizing the use of information, 
statistics, and evaluation to design and implement migration policies. The government 
also asked the collaboration of civil society and non-state actors. The plans and programs 
proposed identified the diversity of migrants and the characteristics of the border for their 
implementation. The result was the Special Migration Program 2014–2018, materializing 
the ideas and efforts of many actors in a specific document for the regulation and 
protection of migrants. Despite program deficiencies, its creation was an advance for the 
policy-making process in Mexico.  
The essence of the Migration Program 2014–2018 changed with the 
implementation of other instruments. For instance, the government created the South 
Border Program for the protection of the human rights of migrants, the reordering of the 
border, and the fostering of regional security and development. Hence, the idea of 
combining security with migration issues, even though it proved to be disastrous, has 
been retaken by the Peña-Nieto administration. This program is more specific to the 
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particularities of border regions, and includes coordination among agencies and with 
Guatemala, but these are security provisions. Measures to regulate migration included in 
this plan are oriented for regional and not for transit migration. Instruments such as the 
Regional Visitor Card, however, could reduce informal crosses and make the border more 
manageable. 
The problem is that programs and instruments created to regulate illegal 
immigration are not allowed to mature. For instance, the increase of unaccompanied 
infant illegal immigrants in transit—and the continuous exposure in the media and 
through non-state actors of the deplorable conditions in which illegal immigrants cross 
the country—triggers a government reaction. This reaction does not result in the 
evaluation and improvement of the programs in place and in making the responsible 
accountable. Instead, it creates more bureaucracy that lacks the resources, organization, 
knowledge, and authority to offer a real solution. The system that was carefully created to 
regulate illegal immigration is now full of organizations with confusing and overlapping 
responsibilities, undermining what the administration was trying to accomplish—and just 
to keep up appearances. 
The Peña-Nieto administration inherited a country flooded in insecurity. The 
regulation of illegal immigration under that context is complicated because control of the 
border and the presence of security agencies are needed. However, the government 
started with ideas, processes, and the intention to bring certainty and protection to Central 
American migrants under humanitarian and democratic principles. The opportunity, 
fundamentals, and legal tools exist to return to that path. The current Mexican 
government is on track to learn from the mistakes of previous administrations and to 
reevaluate what it is doing and where it is going in relation to the management of the 
southern border of the country and the regulation of illegal immigration. If not, Mexico 
will continue as a checkpoint country, submerged in hypocrisy and two-faced discourses, 
and as one of the biggest graveyards for illegal immigrants. 
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